AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the
subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on
a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject
speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing
less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the
parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many
respects the most interesting in the world.
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved
to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to
decide the important question, whether societies of men are really
capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and
choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident and force.
If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are
arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that
decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall
act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general
misfortune of mankind.
This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of
patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and
good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice
should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests,
unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the
public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than
seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations
affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local
institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects
foreign to its merits, and of views, passions, and prejudices little
favorable to the discovery of truth.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new
Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the
obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist
all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument,
and consequence of the offices they hold under the State
establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men,
who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of
their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of
elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial
confederacies than from its union under one government.
It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this
nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve
indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because
their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or
ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men
may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that
much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may
hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless
at least, if not respectable--the honest errors of minds led astray
by preconceived jealousies and fears.
So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which serve to
give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see
wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of
questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if
duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who
are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right in any
controversy.
And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn
from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who
advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their
antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party
opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are
apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose
the right side of a question.
Were there not even inducements to moderation, nothing could be more
ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times,
characterized political parties. For in politics as in religion, it
is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword.
Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.
And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we
have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as
in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry
and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct
of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will
mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to
increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their
declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened
zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized
as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to
the principles of liberty.
An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people,
which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will
be represented as mere pretence and artifice, the stale bait for
popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten,
on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and
that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a
spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust.
On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of
government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the
contemplation of a sound and well-informed judgment, their interest
can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often
lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people
than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and
efficiency of the government.
History will teach us that the former has been found a much more
certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and
that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics,
the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious
court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.
In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my
fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all
attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a
matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions
other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You
will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general
scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the
new Constitution.
Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after having given it an
attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your interest
to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your
liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves
which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of
deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my
convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which
they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains
ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head.
My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My
arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They
shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the
cause of truth.
I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following
interesting particulars:--The utility of the UNION to your political
prosperity--The insufficiency of the present Confederation to
preserve that Union--The necessity of a government at least equally
energetic with the one proposed, to the attainment of this
object--The conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true
principles of republican government--Its analogy to your own State
constitution--and lastly, The additional security which its adoption
will afford to the preservation of that species of government to
liberty, and to property.
In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a
satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made
their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.
It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove
the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the
hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and one,
which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that
we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those who
oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too
great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity
resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.
(Footnote Number 1)
This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated,
till it has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For
nothing can be more evident, to those who are able to take an
enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of
the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will
therefore be of use to begin by examining the advantages of that
Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every
State will be exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly
constitute the subject of my next address.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
Footnotes Explained:
Footnote Number 1. The same idea, tracing the arguments to their
consequences, is held out in several of the late publications
against the new Constitution.
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