IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like
the Americans, intelligent and well-informed) seldom adopt and
steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting
their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great
respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so
long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing
firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient
powers for all general and national purposes.
The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which
appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become
convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.
Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their
safety seems to be the first. The safety of the people doubtless has
relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and
consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it
precisely and comprehensively.
At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for
the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against
dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like
kind arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes
first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let
us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in
their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national
government, affords them the best security that can be devised
against hostilities from abroad.
The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world
will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of
the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or invite them.
If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many
just causes of war are likely to be given by United America as by
disunited America; for if it should turn out that United America
will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this
respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of
peace with other nations.
The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from
violations of treaties or from direct violence. America has already
formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of
them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and
injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and
Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the
circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe
the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears
evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one
national government than it could be either by thirteen separate
States or by three or four distinct confederacies.
Because when once an efficient national government is established,
the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also
will generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or
country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State
assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive
departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents
and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to
offices under the national government,--especially as it will have
the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of
proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence,
it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and
the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise,
systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and
consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as
well as more safe with respect to us.
Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded
in one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas adjudications
on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or
four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and
that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges
appointed by different and independent governments, as from the
different local laws and interests which may affect and influence
them.
The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to the
jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible
only to one national government, cannot be too much commended.
Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt
the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith
and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States,
and consequently having little or no influence on the national
government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and
justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain
adds great weight to this reasoning.
Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed
to resist such temptations, yet, as such temptations may, and
commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and
may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing party
may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice
meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national government,
not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be
induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or
inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.
So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of
treaties and the laws of nations afford just causes of war, they are
less to be apprehended under one general government than under
several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the
safety of the people.
As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and
unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good
national government affords vastly more security against dangers of
that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.
Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions
and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than
of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by
aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but
there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been
provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either
unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given
occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on
some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of
quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if
any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and
a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely,
by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and nothing
can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government,
whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions
which actuate the parties immediately interested.
But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national
government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate
and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and
in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to
act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of states, as well
as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and
opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors
and offenses. The national government, in such cases, will not be
affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and candor
to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them
from the difficulties which threaten them.
Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, and
compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong
united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered
by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power.
In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their
Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to
France, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged
to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion
either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from
Spain, or Britain, or any other powerful nation?
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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