MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people
would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed
to by just causes of war given to other nations; and those reasons
show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would
also be more easily accommodated, by a national government than
either by the State governments or the proposed little
confederacies.
But the safety of the people of America against dangers from foreign
force depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of
war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing
themselves in such a situation as not to invite hostility or insult;
for it need not be observed that there are pretended as well as just
causes of war.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that
nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of
getting any thing by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war
when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and
objects merely personal, such as a thirst for military glory,
revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to
aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These
and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the
sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by
justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent
of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute
monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others
which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on
examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and
circumstances.
With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can
supply their markets cheaper then they can themselves,
notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own
or duties on foreign fish.
With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if
we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as
our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree
diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more
their policy, to restrain than to promote it.
In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one
nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which
they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves
with commodities which we used to purchase from them.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this
continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,
added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and
address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater
share in the advantages which those territories afford, than
consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the
one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the
other; not will either of them permit the other waters which are
between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and
traffic.
From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent
with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see
that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds
and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that
they should regard our advancement in union, in power and
consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and
composure
The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise
out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at
present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and
opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify them will
not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good
national government as necessary to put and keep them in such a
situation as, instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and
discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible state of
defence, and necessarily depends on the government, the arms, and
the resources of the country.
As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and cannot
be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let
us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to the
object in question, more competent then any other given number
whatever.
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and
experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may
be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can
harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members,
and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In
the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole,
and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of
the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the
defence of any particular part, and that more easily and
expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can
possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place
the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their
officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate,
will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby
render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into
three or four distinct independent companies.
What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed
the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the
government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the
government of Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three
governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their
respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as
the single government of Great Britain would?
We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may come,
if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage attention. But
if one national government had not so regulated the navigation of
Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one national
government had not called forth all the national means and materials
for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have
been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet--let
Scotland have its navigation and fleet--let Wales have its
navigation and fleet--let Ireland have its navigation and fleet--let
those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be under
four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how soon
they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into
thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent
governments--what armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could
they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to
its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defence? Would
there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its
specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to
decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake
of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose
importance they are content to see diminished. Although such conduct
would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The history
of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds with such
instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often happened
would, under similar circumstances, happen again.
But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or
confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of men
and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and from
which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the
terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide
between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and
inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas
one government, watching over the general and common interests. and
combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would
be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the
safety of the people.
But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one
national government, or split into a number of confederacies,
certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as
it is; and they will act towards us accordingly. If they see that
our national government is efficient and well administered, our
trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and
disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our
credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they
will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke
our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute
of an effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as to
its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or four
independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies, one
inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, and
perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor,
pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she
become not only to their contempt, but to their outrage; and how
soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or
family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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