QUEEN Anne, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the Union
then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our
attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from
it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of
lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property;
remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and
differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your
strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island,
being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of
different interest, will be enabled to resist all its enemies." "We
most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great
and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy
conclusion, being the only effectual way to secure our present and
future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your
enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, use their utmost
endeavors to prevent or delay this union."
It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions
at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would
tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good
government within ourselves. This subjects is copious and cannot
easily be exhausted.
The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general
the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may
profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost
them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of
such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they were
for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost
constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.
Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental
nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and
practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually
kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more
inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to
each other.
Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar
jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their
being "joined in affection" and free from all apprehension of
different "interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish
confidence and affection,and the partial interests of each
confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would
be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most
other bordering nations, they would always be either involved in
disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot
reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal
footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form them
so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what human
contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality? Independent
of those local circumstances which tend to beget and increase power
in one part and to impede its progress in another, we must advert to
the effects of that superior policy and good management which would
probably distinguish the government of one above the rest, and by
which their relative equality in strength and consideration would be
destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that the same degree of sound
policy, prudence, and foresight would uniformly be observed by each
of these confederacies for a long succession of years.
Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen it
would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise on
the scale of political importance much above the degree of her
neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy
and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance,
if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her
importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated to
advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be
necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions.
She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors,
but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust
naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind
conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and
uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the
proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be
unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner
would this become evident than the Northern Hive would excite the
same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America
which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it
appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be
tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air
of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.
They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in
contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they
would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one
another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy,
and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in
the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz.,
formidable only to each other.
From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are
greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive
might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that
combination and union of wills, of arms, and of resources, which
would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of
defence against foreign enemies.
When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain were
formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their forces
against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be distinct
nations. Each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to
regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and
commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would
those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial
concerns must create different interests, and of course different
degrees of political attachment to and connection with different
foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that the
foreign nation with whom the Southern confederacy might be at war
would be the one with whom the Northern confederacy would be the
most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so
contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be easy to
form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with
perfect good faith.
Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe,
neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests
and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different
sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more
natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another
than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be
more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign
alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances
between themselves.
And here let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive
foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country,
than it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests
did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and what
innovations did they under the same character introduce into the
governments of those whom they pretended to protect.
Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into any
given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure us
against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign
nations.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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