THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an
enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state
of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now
proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more
alarming kind--those which will in all probability flow from
dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic
factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances
slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more
full investigation.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously
doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or
only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which
they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with
each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an
argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are
ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of
harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties
in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course
of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience
of ages.
The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There are
some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the
collective bodies of society. Of this description are the love of
power or the desire of preeminence and dominion--the jealousy of
power, or the desire of equality and safety.
There are others which have a more circumscribed though an equally
operative influence within their spheres. Such are the rivalships
and competitions of commerce between commercial nations.
And there are others, not less numerous than either of the former,
which take their origin entirely in private passions; in the
attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears of leading
individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of
this class, whether the favorites of a king or of a people, have in
too many instances abused the confidence they possessed; and
assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled to
sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage or
personal gratification.
The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a
prostitute, (footnote 1.) at the expense of much of the blood and
treasure of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the
city of the Samnians. The same man, stimulated by private pique
against the Megarensians,(footnote 2.) another nation of Greece, or
to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice
in a supposed theft of the statuary of Phidias,(footnote 3.) or to
get rid of the accusations prepared to be brought against him for
dissipating the funds of the state in the purchase of
popularity,(footnote 4.) or from a combination of all these causes,
was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished
in the Grecian annals by the name of the Peloponnesian war; which,
after various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated
in the ruin of the Athenian commonwealth.
The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,
permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,(footnote 5.)
entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid
prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favor
and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he
precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the
plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and
independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his
counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a sovereign
who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy, it was
the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once the
instrument and the dupe.
The influence which the bigotry of one female,(footnote 6.) the
petulance of another,(footnote 7.) and the cabals of a
third,(footnote 8.) had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and
pacifications, of a considerable part of Europe, are to topics that
have been too often descanted upon not to be generally known.
To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the
production of great national events, either foreign or domestic,
according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.
Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from
which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of
instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature
will not stand in need of such lights, to form their opinion either
of the reality or extent of that agency.
Perhaps, however, a reference, tending to illustrate the general
principle, may with propriety be made to a case which has lately
happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a desperate debtor,
it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been
plunged into a civil war.
But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this
particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men,
who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between
the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The
genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce
has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those
inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial
republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in
ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual
interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.
Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true
interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and
philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in
fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found
that momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a more active
and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote
considerations of policy, utility, or justice? Have republics in
practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the
former administered by men as well as the latter? Are there not
aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust
acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular
assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment,
jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities?
Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by
a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of course,
liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those
individuals?
Has commerce hitherto done any thing more than change the objects of
war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a
passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars
founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing
system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of
territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many
instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the
one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of
human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries.
Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them,
Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often
engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring
monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better than a
well-regulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and
conquest.
Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the
very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her
arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before
Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of
Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.
Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of ambition,
till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope Julius
II. found means to accomplish that formidable league,9 which gave a
deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty republic.
The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts and
taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe.
They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea,
and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the
opponents of Louis XIV.
In the government of Britain the representatives of the people
compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been
for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations,
nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars
in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances,
proceeded from the people.
There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as
royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of the
representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs
into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations,
and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the state. In that
memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of
Austria and Bourbon, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is
well known that the antipathies of the English against the French,
seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite
leader,(footnote 9.) protracted the war beyond the limits marked out
by sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the
views of the court.
The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great measure
grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of supplanting
and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of
traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation.
From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose
situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what
reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce
us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members
of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not
already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle
theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the
imperfections, weaknesses, and evils incident to society in every
shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden
age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our
political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the
globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and
perfect virtue?
Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity
and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a
lax and ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part
of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances in
Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in
Massachusetts, declare-----!
So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the
tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of
discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion,
that it has from long observation of the progress of society become
a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of
situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent
writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect:
"NEIGHBORING NATIONS [says he] are naturally enemies of each other,
unless their common weakness forces them to league in a
CONFEDERATIVE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the
differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret
jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the
expense of their neighbors." (footnote 10.) This passage, at the
same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
Footnotes Explained:
Footnote Number 1. Aspasia, vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles."
Footnote Number 2. Ibid.
Footnote Number 3. Ibid.
Footnote Number 4. Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some
public gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment
of the statue of Minerva.
Footnote Number 5. Worn by the popes.
Footnote Number 6. Madame de Maintenon.
Footnote Number 7. Duchess of Marlbourgh.
Footnote Number 8. Madame de Pompadour.
Footnote Number 9. The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor,
the King of France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian
princes and states.
Footnote Number 10. Vide "Principes des Negociations" par l'Abbe de
Mably.
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