ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several
States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might
happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy,
would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of
friendship and enmity with each other, which have fallen to the lot
of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us
enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would
attend such a situation.
War between the States, in the first period of their separate
existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it
commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments
have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on
the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to
liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the
signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of
preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of
war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has
contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled
with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion.
Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, to
gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments occur
at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress of an
invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the heart
of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its
approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of
disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts,
is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one
much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the
globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires
overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide
nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort
and little acquisition.
In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy
of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible.
The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one State open
to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would,
with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors.
Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained.
War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory. PLUNDER and
devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of
individuals would make the principal figure in the events which
would characterize our military exploits.
This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it would
not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is the most
powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent love of
liberty will after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent
destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual
effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will
compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and
security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their
civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become
willing to run the risk of being less free.
The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the
correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing
armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new
Constitution; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under
it. (footnote 1.) Their existence, however, from the very terms of
the proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But
standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a
dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant
apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will
infallibly produce them. The weaker States or confederacies would
first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equality with
their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the
inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and
effective system of defence, by disciplined troops, and by
fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to
strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their
constitutions would acquire a progressive direction towards
monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at
the expense of the legislative authority.
The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the States
or confederacies that made use of them a superiority over their
neighbors. Small states, or states of less natural strength, under
vigorous governments, and with the assistance of disciplined armies,
have often triumphed over large states, or states of greater natural
strength, which have been destitute of these advantages. Neither the
pride nor the safety of the more important States or confederacies
would permit them long to submit to this mortifying and adventitious
superiority. They would quickly resort to means similar to those by
which it had been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost
preeminence. Thus we should, in a little time, see established in
every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have
been the scourge of the Old World. This, at least, would be the
natural course of things; and our reasonings will be the more likely
to be just, in proportion as they are accommodated to this standard.
These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative
defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the
hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they
are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress
of human affairs.
It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not
standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often
distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers,
equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious
habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of
gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce,
are incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which
was the true condition of the people of those republics. The means
of revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of
gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of
finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the
habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system
of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body
of the citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in
a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and
in one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of
them. The rulers of the former can have no good pretext, if they are
even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of
necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the
first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior
defence, the people are in no danger of being broken to military
subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor
of military exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor,
neither corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or
propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army renders
the natural strength of the community an overmatch for it; and the
citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for
protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear
the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence
in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they
suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights. The army
under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress
a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will
be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the
great body of the people.
In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of all
this happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the
government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be
numerous enough for instant defence. The continual necessity for
their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and
proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military
state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of
territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to
frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their
sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to
consider the soldiery not only as their protectors but as their
superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of
considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is
very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions to
make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the
military power.
The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description. An
insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great
measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the
necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force
to make head against a sudden descent, till the militia could have
time to rally and embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No
motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion
have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic
establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room for
the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as the
consequences of internal war.
This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great degree,
contributed to preserve the liberty which that country to this day
enjoys, in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption. If, on
the contrary, Britain had been situated on the continent, and had
been compelled, as she would have been, by that situation, to make
her military establishments at home coextensive with those of the
other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all
probability be, at this day, a victim to the absolute power of a
single man. 'Tis possible, though not easy, that the people of that
island may be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by the
prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually
kept up within the kingdom.
If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an
advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a
great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely
to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give
us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments
cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we
should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain
separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together
into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of
time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe--our
liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves
against the ambition and jealousy of each other.
This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It
deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent
and honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and
solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this
interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes,
and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part
with trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which
would in all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy
phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of
its adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial
forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
Footnotes Explained:
Footnote Number 1. This objection will be fully examined in its
proper place, and it will be shown that the only natural precaution
which could have been taken on this subject has been taken; and a
much better one than is to be found in any constitution that has
been heretofore framed in America, most of which contain no guard at
all on this subject.
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