AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated
and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged
against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of
America. It may be said that it would tend to render the government
of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb those
residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with
the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the
love of power which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am
at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the
administration of the general government could ever feel to divest
the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of
the mere domestic police of a State appear to me to hold out slender
allurements to ambition.
Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the
objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and
all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first
instance, to be lodged in the national depository.
The administration of private justice between the citizens of the
same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of
a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be
provided for by local legislation, can never be desireable cares of
a general jurisdiction.
It is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition in
the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are
connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as
troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the possession of them, for
that reason, would contribute nothing to the dignity, to the
importance, or to the splendor of the national government.
But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere wantonness
and lusts of domination would be sufficient to beget that
disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the
constituent body of the national representatives, or, in other
words, the people of the several States, would control the
indulgence of so extravagant an appetite.
It will always be far more easy for the State governments to
encroach upon the national authorities, than for the national
government to encroach upon the State authorities.
The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of
influence which the State governments, if they administer their
affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over
the people; a circumstance which at the same time teaches us that
there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal
constitutions; and that too much pain cannot be taken in their
organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with
the principles of liberty.
The superiority of influence in favor of the particular governments
would result partly from the diffusive construction of the national
government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the
attention of the State administrations would be directed.
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are commonly
weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object.
Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family
than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community
at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger
bias towards their local governments than towards the government of
the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by
a much better administration of the latter.
This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful
auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.
The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall
under the superintendence of the local administrations, and which
will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every part
of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a detail
too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it
might afford.
There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the
State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a
clear and satisfactory light,--I mean the ordinary administration of
criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most
powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular
obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and
visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits and its
terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all
those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the
sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes,
more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of
the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government.
This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost
wholly through the channels of the particular governments,
independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so
decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them
at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not infrequently,
dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.
The operations of the national government, on the other hand,
falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the
citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and
attended to by speculative men.
Relating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come
home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely
to inspire an habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment
of attachment.
The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by the
experience of all federal constitutions with which we are
acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to
them.
Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,
confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of
association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign, whose
authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of
subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land
allotted to them, and numerous trains of inferior vassals or
retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of
fealty or obedience to the persons of whom they held it.
Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign within his particular
demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual
opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between
the great barons or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the
head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the
public peace, or to protect the people against the oppressions of
their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is
emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike
temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight
and influence, which answered, for the time, the purposes of a more
regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed
over that of the prince; and in many instances his dominion was
entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected into
independent principalities or States. In those instances in which
the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success was
chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their dependents.
The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the sovereign and the
oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and detested by both;
till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a union between them
fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the nobles, by a conduct
of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity and devotion of
their retainers and followers, the contests between them and the
prince must almost always have ended in their favor, and in the
abridgement or subversion of the royal authority.
This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or
conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be
cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of
clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom,
uniting the nobles and their dependents by ties equivalent to those
of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the
power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued
its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those
rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic
system of civil polity had previously established in the latter
kingdom.
The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared with
the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that from
the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the
confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a
support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the
national government. It will be well if they are not able to
counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of
similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both,
and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the
community into particular DEPOSITS, in one case at the disposal of
individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.
A concise review of the events that have attended confederate
governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an
inattention to which has been the great source of our political
mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side.
This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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