THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather of
aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all the
lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.
The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and
each state or province is a composition of equal and independent
cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but the
cities must be unanimous.
The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General,
consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the
provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for six,
three, and one year; from two provinces they continue in appointment
during pleasure.
The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and
alliances; to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip fleets;
to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all these cases,
however, unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are
requisite. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors;
to execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide for the
collection of duties on imports and exports; to regulate the mint,
with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the
dependent territories. The provinces are restrained, unless with the
general consent, from entering into foreign treaties; from
establishing imposts injurious to others, or charging their
neighbors with higher duties than their own subjects. A council of
state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of admiralty, aid
and fortify the federal administration.
The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now
an hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the
republic are derived from this independent title; from his great
patrimonial estates; from his family connections with some of the
chief potentates of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his
being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the
union; in which provincial quality he has the appointment of town
magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees,
presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has
throughout the power of pardon.
As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable
prerogatives.
In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes
between the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the
deliberations of the States-General, and at their particular
conferences; to give audiences to foreign ambassadors, and to keep
agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.
In his military capacity he commands the federal troops, provides
for garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs; disposes
of all appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the
governments and posts of fortified towns.
In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends and
directs every thing relative to naval forces and other naval
affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy; appoints
lieutenant-admirals and other officers; and establishes councils of
war, whose sentences are not executed till he approves them.
His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three
hundred thousand florins. The standing army which he commands
consists of about forty thousand men.
Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as
delineated on parchment. What the characters which practice has
stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the
provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious existence
in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.
It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred of
his countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being ruined
by the vices of their constitution.
The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes an
authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to secure
harmony, but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very
different from the theory.
The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy
certain contributions; but this article never could, and probably
never will, be executed; because the inland provinces, who have
little commerce, cannot pay an equal quota.
In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the articles
of the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the consenting
provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting for the others;
and then to obtain reimbursement from the others, by deputations,
which are frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The great wealth and
influence of the province of Holland enable her to effect both these
purposes.
It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be
ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing
practicable, though dreadful, in a confederacy where one of the
members exceeds in force all the rest, and where several of them are
too small to meditate resistance; but utterly impracticable in one
composed of members, several of which are equal to each other in
strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and
persevering defence.
Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a
foreign minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by tampering
with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of Hanover was
delayed by these means a whole year. Instances of a like nature are
numerous and notorious.
In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled to
overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a
treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of
Westphalia, in 1648, by which their independence was formally and
finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zealand.
Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great Britain, the
constitutional principle of unanimity was departed from.
A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for
want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the
public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at
the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must
depend on the contingencies of the moment.
Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power,
called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution,
than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional
authorities.
Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership, it
has been supposed that without his influence in the individual
provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would
long ago have dissolved it. "Under such a government," says the Abbe
Mably, "the Union could never have subsisted, if the provinces had
not a spring within themselves, capable of quickening their
tardiness, and compelling them to the same way of thinking. This
spring is the stadtholder." It is remarked by Sir William Temple,
"that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership, Holland, by her
riches and her authority, which drew the others into a sort of
dependence, supplied the place."
These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the
tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose
an absolute necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time
that they nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices which
keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy.
The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these
vices, and have made no less than four regular experiments by
extraordinary assemblies, convened for the special purpose, to apply
a remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible
to unite the public councils in reforming the known, the
acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution.
Let us pause, my fellow-citizens, for one moment, over this
melancholy and monitory lesson of history; and with the tear that
drops for the calamities brought on mankind by their adverse
opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude mingle an
ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord which has
distinguished the consultations for our political happiness.
The design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be
administered by the federal authority. This also had its adversaries
and failed.
This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular
convulsions, from dissensions among the states, and from the actual
invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their destiny. All nations
have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. The first wish
prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a
revolution of their government as will establish their union, and
render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom, and happiness: The
next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these
blessings will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and
console them for the catastrophe of their own.
I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of
these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and
where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and
sacred. The important truth which it unequivocally pronounces in the
present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government
over governments, a legislation for communities, as
contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory,
so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil
polity, by substituting violence in place of law, or the destructive
coercion of the sword in place of the mild and salutary coercion of
the magistracy.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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