TO THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal government,
in respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I
have met with but one specific objection, which, if I understand it
right, is this,--that proper provision has not been made against the
existence of standing armies in time of peace; an objection which, I
shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and unsubstantial
foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general
form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of
argument, without even the sanction of theoretical opinions, in
contradiction to the practice of other free nations, and to the
general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing
constitutions. The propriety of this remark will appear the moment
it is recollected that the objection under consideration turns upon
a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority of the
nation, in the article of military establishments, a principle
unheard of, except in one or two of our State constitutions, and
rejected in all the rest.
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the
present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan
reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two
conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, that
standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it
vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without
subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of
legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be
surprised to discover that neither the one nor the other was the
case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the
Legislature, not in the Executive; that this legislature was to be a
popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people
periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had
supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in
respect to this object, an important qualification even of the
legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the
appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer
period than two years--a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it,
will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up
of troops without evident necessity.
Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed would
be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would
naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement
and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It
must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have,
in all the preceding models of the constitutions which they have
established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this
point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to
all this apprehension and clamor.
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the
several State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment
to find that two only of them (footnote 1.) contained an
interdiction of standing armies in time of peace; that the other
eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had
in express terms admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize
their existence.
Still, however, he would be persuaded that there must be some
plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never
be able to imagine, while any source of information remained
unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experiment upon the
public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to
deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be
ingenuous. It would probably occur to him that he would be likely to
find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact
between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a
solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the
existing Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions
against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure
from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent
which appears to influence these political champions.
If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of
the articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be
increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the
unexpected discovery, that these articles, instead of containing the
prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous
circumspection, restricted the authority of the State legislatures
in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of
the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility,
or ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding
these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and
unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a
fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their
country!
How else, he would say, could the authors of them have been tempted
to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in which it
seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of America as
declared in its different forms of government, and in which it has
even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If,
on the contrary, he happened to be a man of calm and dispassionate
feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature,
and would lament that, in a matter so interesting to the happiness
of millions, the true merits of the question should be perplexed and
entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right
determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking that a
conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to
mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to
convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings.
But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by
precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer
view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will
appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in
respect to military establishments in time of peace would be
improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of
society, would be unlikely to be observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet
there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of
confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into
our rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion of
Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet the British
settlements, are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion
of Spain. This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands,
belonging to these two powers, create between them, in respect to
their American possessions and in relation to us, a common interest.
The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as
our natural enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to
fear from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the
art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication,
rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain and
Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A future
concert of views between these nations ought not to be regarded as
improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity is every day
diminishing the force of the family compact between France and
Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason considered the
ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of political
connection. These circumstances combined admonish us not to be too
sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of
danger.
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been
a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western
frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be
indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and
depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be
furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by
permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is
impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia
would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their
occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in
times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or
compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of
service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious
pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the
scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as
ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps
in the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of
peace, a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small.
Here is a simple view of the subject that shows us at once the
impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments,
and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and
prudence of the legislature.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it
may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their
military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be
willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenceless condition, to
their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to
increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which
our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be,
particular posts, the possession of which will include the command
of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of
the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be keys
to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be
wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized
by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable powers? To act
this part would be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence and
policy.
If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our
Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a
navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and for
the defence of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a
nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its
dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons
for that purpose; but where naval establishments are in their
infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an
indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the
arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
Footnotes Explained:
Footnote Number 1. This statement of the matter is taken from the
printed collection of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North
Carolina are the two which contain the interdiction in these words:
"As standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY
OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than a
PROHIBITION. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland
have, in each of their bills of rights, a clause to this effect:
"Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be
raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE"; which is
a formal admission of authority of the Legislature. New York has no
bills of rights, and her constitution says not a word about the
matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions of
the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions are
equally silent. I am told, however, that one or two States have
bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but that
those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this
respect.
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