IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution
the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the
salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the
energy of government with the security of private rights. A failure
in this delicate and important point is the great source of the
inconveniences we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid a
repetition of the error, in our future attempts to rectify and
ameliorate our system, we may travel from one chimerical project to
another; we may try change after change: but we shall never be
likely to make any material change for the better
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of
providing for the national defence, is one of those refinements
which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than
enlightened. We have seen, however, that it has not had thus far an
extensive prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its
first appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two
States by which it has been in any degree patronized; and that all
the others have refused to give it the least countenance; wisely
judging that confidence must be placed somewhere; that the necessity
of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating power; and
that it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence than to
embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by impolitic
restrictions on the legislative authority. The opponents of the
proposed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general decision
of America; and instead of being taught by experience the propriety
of correcting any extremes into which we may have heretofore run,
they appear disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous,
and more extravagant. As if the tone of government had been found
too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are calculated to
induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients which, upon other
occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed
without the imputation of invective, that if the principles they
inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as to become the
popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this country
for any species of government whatever. But a danger of this kind is
not to be apprehended. The citizens of America have too much
discernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if
experience has not wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the
public mind, that greater energy of government is essential to the
welfare and prosperity of the community.
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and
progress of this idea, which aims at the exclusion of military
establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may
arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such
institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other
ages and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced
to those habits of thinking which we derive from the nation from
whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.
In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the authority
of the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were gradually made
upon the prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by the barons, and
afterwards by the people, till the greatest part of its most
formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not till the
revolution in 1688, which elevated the Prince of Orange to the
throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely
triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of making war, an
acknowledge prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had, by his own
authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular
troops. And this number James II. increased to 30,000; who were paid
out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the exercise of
so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the Bill of
Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a standing army
within the kingdom in time of peace, unless with the consent of
Parliament, was against law."
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch,
no security against the danger of standing armies was thought
requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by
the mere authority of the executive magistrate. The patriots, who
effected that memorable revolution, were too temperate, too
well-informed, to think of any restraint on the legislative
discretion. They were aware that a certain number of troops for
guards and garrisons were indispensable; that no precise bounds
could be set to the national exigencies; that a power equal to every
possible contingency must exist somewhere in the government: and
that when they referred the exercise of that power to the judgment
of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point of
precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the community.
From the same source, the people of America may be said to have
derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing
armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution quickened
the public sensibility on every point connected with the security of
popular rights, and in some instances raised the warmth of our zeal
beyond the degree which consisted with the due temperature of the
body politic. The attempts of two of the States to restrict the
authority of the legislature in the article of military
establishments are of the number of the instances. The principles
which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an hereditary
monarch were by an injudicious excess extended to the
representatives of the people in their popular assemblies. Even in
some of the States, where this error was not adopted, we find
unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not be kept up,
in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE. I call
them unnecessary, because the reason which had introduced a similar
provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable to any
of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at all,
under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to
reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it
was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not
be done without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of
doing it. Accordingly, in some of those constitutions, and among
others, in that of this State of New York, which has been justly
celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of the best of the
forms of government established in this country, there is a total
silence upon the subject.
It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have
meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of
peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than
prohibitory. It is not said that standing armies shall not be kept
up, but that they ought not to be kept up in time of peace. This
ambiguity of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict
between jealousy and conviction; between the desire of excluding
such establishments at all events, and the persuasion that an
absolute exclusion would be unwise and unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of
public affairs was understood to require a departure form it, would
be interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and would
be made to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the
State? Let the fact already mentioned, with respect to Pennsylvania,
decide. What then (it may be asked) is the use of such a provision,
if it cease to operate the moment there is an inclination to
disregard it?
Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of
efficacy, between the provisions alluded to and that which is
contained in the new Constitution, for restraining the
appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two
years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to effect
nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and
by being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the
exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and powerful
operation.
The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this
provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the
propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new
resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter,
by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not at
liberty to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the
support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be
willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of
party, in different degrees, must be expected to infect all
political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the national
legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the
views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military
force will always be a favorable topic for declamation. As often as
the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and
attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if the
majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the
community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity
of taking measures to guard against it.
Independent of parties in the national legislature itself, as often
as the period of discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who
will always be not only vigilant but suspicious and jealous
guardians of the rights of the citizens against encroachments from
the federal government, will constantly have their attention awake
to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if
any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and
not only to be the VOICE, but, if necessary, the ARM of their
discontent.
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community require time
to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to
menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive
augmentations; which would suppose, not merely a temporary
combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued
conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a
combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be
preserved in, and transmitted along through all the successive
variations in a representative body, which biennial elections would
naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man,
the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House of
Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to
his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one
man, discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold
or honest enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If
such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an
end of all delegated authority. The people should resolve to recall
all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their own
hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are
counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own
concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the
concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable.
It would be announced, by the very circumstance or augmenting the
army to so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable
reason could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast
augmentations of the military force? It is impossible that the
people could be long deceived; and the destruction of the project,
and of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation
of money for the support of any army to the period of two years
would be unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a
force large enough to awe the people into submission, would find
resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense
with supplies from the acts of the legislature. But the question
again recurs, upon what pretence could he be put in possession of a
force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have
been created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign
war, then it becomes a case not within the principles of the
objection; for this is levelled against the power of keeping up
troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary as
seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to
quell a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defence of the
community under such circumstances should make it necessary to have
an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those
calamities for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It
cannot be provided against by any possible form of government; it
might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if
it should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form
an army for common defence.
But is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united than
in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an
evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is
not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can
assail the whole Union, as to demand a force considerable enough to
place our liberties in the least jeopardy, especially if we take
into our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought
always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But
in a state of disunion (as has been fully shown in another place),
the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable, but
almost unavoidable.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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