IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the
kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a
military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other
things have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general
assertion, unsupported by an precise or intelligible designation of
the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to
divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in
a presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise
of federal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving
any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy or
inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and external, let
us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in
the people. Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of
the general government will be worse administered than those of the
State government, there seems to be no room for the presumption of
ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people. I believe it
may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence in and
obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the
goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that
there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend so
entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot be considered as
having any relation to the intrinsic merits or demerits of a
constitution. These can only be judged of by general principles and
maxims.
Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers,
to induce a probability that the general government will be better
administered than the particular governments: the principal of which
reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election will
present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people; that
through the medium of the State legislatures-- which are select
bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of the national
Senate--there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be
composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances
promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the
national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by
the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional
ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in
smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils, beget
injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender
schemes which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or
desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust.
Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify that
probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more critical
eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to
erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory
reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal
government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to
render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no
reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union
will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in
need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws
of the particular members.
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread
of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will
not the government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree
of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole
Confederacy, be more likely to repress the former sentiment and to
inspire the latter, than that of a single State, which can only
command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State
may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the
government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to
imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If
this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from
irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the
Confederacy than to that of a single member.
I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the
less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more
the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the
ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are
accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their
political life; the more it is familiarized to their sight and to
their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which touch
the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs
of the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will
conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very
much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses
will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A government
continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to
interest the sensations of the people. The inference is, that the
authority of the Union, and the affections of the citizens towards
it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension to
what are called matters of internal concern; and will have less
occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and
comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through
those channels and currents in which the passions of mankind
naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and
perilous expedients of compulsion.
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like
the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of
using force than the species of league contended for by most of its
opponents, the authority of which should only operate upon the
States in their political or collective capacities. It has been
shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the
laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are the
natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as
often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war
and violence.
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of
the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States,
will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of
each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that this
will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all distinction
between the sources from which they might proceed; and will give the
federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience
to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State,
in addition to the influence on public opinion which will result
from the important consideration of its having power to call to its
assistance and support the resources of the whole Union. It merits
particular attention in this place, that the laws of the
Confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its
jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the
observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and
judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath.
Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective
members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national
government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends;
and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.
(footnote 1.) Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the
consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is good
ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the
laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common
share of prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we
may deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is
certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of
the best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to
provoke and precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But
though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume
that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives of
public good, or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them
how the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be
promoted by such a conduct?
Signed "PUBLIUS"
Footnotes Explained:
Footnote Number 1. The sophistry which has been employed, to show
that this will tend to the destruction of the State governments,
will, in its proper place, be fully detected.
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