IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or
first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.
These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all
reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind. Where it
produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some defect or
disorder in the organs of perception, or from the influence of some
strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of this nature are the
maxims in geometry, that "the whole is greater its parts; things
equal to the same are equal to one another; two straight lines
cannot enclose a space; and all right angles are equal to each
other.
Of the same nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics,
that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought
to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be
commensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation
of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of
limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter sciences
which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are
yet such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves,
and so agreeable to the nature and unsophisticated dictates of
common-sense, that they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased
mind, with a degree of force and conviction almost equally
irresistible.
The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted from
those pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly passions
of the human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt not only
the more simple theorems of the science, but even those abstruse
paradoxes which, however they may appear susceptible of
demonstration, are at variance with the natural conceptions which
the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would be led to entertain
upon the subject. The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or in other
words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even
to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geometricians, though
not less incomprehensible to common-sense than any of those
mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of infidelity
have been so industriously levelled.
But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far less
tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that this
should be the case. Caution and investigation are a necessary armor
against error and imposition. But this untractableness may be
carried too far, and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or
disingenuity. Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of
moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of
certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have much better
claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in
particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The
obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the
reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not
give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding to some
untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words and confound
themselves in subtleties.
How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere in
their opposition) that positions so clear as those which manifest
the necessity of a general power of taxation in the government of
the Union should have to encounter any adversaries among men of
discernment? Though these positions have been elsewhere fully
stated, they will perhaps not be improperly recapitulated in this
place, as introductory to an examination of what may have been
offered by way of objection to them. They are in substance as
follows:
A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the
full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the
complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible, free
from every other control but a regard to the public good and to the
sense of the people.
As the duties of superintending the national defence and of securing
the public peace against foreign or domestic violence involve a
provision for casualties and dangers to which no possible limits can
be assigned, the power of making that provision ought to know no
other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the resources of
the community.
As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering
the national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring
that article in its full extent must necessarily be comprehended in
that of providing for those exigencies.
As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring
revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their
collective capacities, the federal government must of necessity be
invested with an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary
modes.
Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to
conclude that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the
national government might safely be permitted to rest on the
evidence of these propositions, unassisted by any additional
arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact, that the
antagonists of the proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in
their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and most
zealous effort against this part of the plan. It may therefore be
satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which they combat it.
Those of them which have been most labored with that view seem in
substance to amount to this: "It is not true, because the exigencies
of the Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that its power of
laying taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is an requisite to the
purposes of the local administrations as to those of the Union; and
the former are at least of equal importance with the latter to the
happiness of the people. It is, therefore, as necessary that the
State governments should be able to command the means of supplying
their wants, as that the national government should possess the like
faculty in respect to the wants of the Union. But an indefinite
power of taxation in the latter might, and probably would in time,
deprive the former of the means of providing for their own
necessities; and would subject them entirely to the mercy of the
national legislature. As the laws of the Union are to become the
supreme law of the land, as it is to have power to pass all laws
that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the authorities
with which it is proposed to vest it, the national government might
at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects upon the
pretence of an interference with its own. It might allege a
necessity of doing this in order to give efficacy to the national
revenues. And thus all the resources of taxation might by degrees
become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and
destruction of the State governments."
This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the
supposition of usurpation in the national government; at other times
it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the constitutional
operation of its intended powers. It is only in the latter light
that it can be admitted to have any pretensions to fairness. The
moment we launch into conjectures about the usurpations of the
federal government, we get into an unfathomable abyss, and fairly
put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning.
Imagination may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst the
labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and knows not on which side to
turn to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has so
rashly adventured. Whatever may be the limits or modifications of
the powers of the Union, it is easy to imagine an endless train of
possible dangers; and by indulging an excess of jealousy and
timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute skepticism
and irresolution. I repeat what I have observed in substance in
another place, that all observations founded upon the danger of
usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of
the government, not to the nature or extent of its powers.
The State governments, by their original constitutions, are invested
with complete sovereignty. In what does our security consist against
usurpation from that quarter? Doubtless in the manner of their
formation, and in a due dependence of those who are to administer
them upon the people. If the proposed construction of the federal
government be found, upon an impartial examination of it, to be such
as to afford, to a proper extent, the same species of security, all
apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded.
It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State
governments to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as
probable as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights
of the State governments. What side would be likely to prevail in
such a conflict, must depend on the means which the contending
parties could employ towards insuring success. As in republics
strength is always on the side of the people, and as there are
weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State governments will
commonly possess most influence over them, the natural conclusion is
that such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of
the Union; and that there is greater probability of encroachments by
the members upon the federal head than by the federal head upon the
members.
But it is evident that all conjectures of this kind must be
extremely vague and fallible: that it is by far the safest course to
lay them altogether aside, and to confine our attention wholly to
the nature and extent of the powers as they are delineated in the
Constitution. Every thing beyond this must be left to the prudence
and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold the scales in
their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always take care to
preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the general and the
State governments. Upon this ground, which is evidently the true
one, it will not be difficult to obviate the objections which have
been made to an indefinite power of taxation in the United States.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
|