I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that
the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would have
COEQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except
as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States far the
greatest part of the resources of the community, there can be no
color for the assertion that they would not possess means as
abundant as could be desired for the supply of their own wants,
independent of all external control. That the field is sufficiently
wide will more fully appear when we come to advert to the
inconsiderable share of the public expenses for which it will fall
to the lot of the State governments to provide.
To argue upon abstract principles that this coordinate authority
cannot exist, is to set up supposition and theory against fact and
reality. However proper such reasonings might be to show that a
thing ought not to exist, they are wholly to be rejected when they
are made use of to prove that it does not exist contrary to the
evidence of the fact itself. It is well known that in the Roman
republic the legislative authority, in the last resort, resided for
ages in two different political bodies--not as branches of the same
legislature, but as distinct and independent legislatures, in each
of which an opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in
the other, the plebeian. Many arguments might have been adduced to
prove the unfitness of two such seemingly contradictory authorities,
each having power to annul or repeal the acts of the other. But a
man would have been regarded as frantic who should have attempted at
Rome to disprove their existence. It will be readily understood that
I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA and the COMITIA TRIBUTA. The
former, in which the people voted by centuries, was so arranged as
to give a superiority to the patrician interest; in the latter, in
which numbers prevailed, the plebeian interest had an entire
predominancy. And yet these two legislatures coexisted for ages, and
the Roman republic attained to the utmost height of human greatness.
In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such
contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is no power on
either side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice there is
little reason to apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a short
course of time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce
themselves within a very narrow compass; and in the interim, the
United States will, in all probability, find it convenient to
abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular States
would be inclined to resort.
To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this question,
it will be well to advert to the proportion between the objects that
will require a federal provision in respect to revenue, and those
which will require a State provision. We shall discover that the
former are altogether unlimited, and that the latter are
circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In pursuing this inquiry,
we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view to the
present period, but to look forward to remote futurity.
Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a
calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a combination of these
with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and
tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more
fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be
lodged in the national government, from an estimate of its immediate
necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future
contingencies as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in
their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is
true, perhaps, that a computation might be made with sufficient
accuracy to answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue requisite
to discharge the subsisting engagements of the Union, and to
maintain those establishments which, for some time to come, would
suffice in time of peace. But would it be wise, or would it not
rather be the extreme of folly to stop at this point, and to leave
the government intrusted with the care of the national defence in a
state of absolute incapacity to provide for the protection of the
community against future invasions of the public peace, by foreign
war or domestic convulsions? If, on the contrary, we ought to exceed
this point, where can we stop, short of an indefinite power of
providing for emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy to
assert, in general terms, the possibility of forming a rational
judgment of a due provision against probable dangers, yet we may
safely challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward their
data, and may affirm that they would be found as vague and uncertain
as any that could be produced to establish the probable duration of
the world. Observations confined to the mere prospects of internal
attacks can deserve no weight; though even these will admit of no
satisfactory calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people,
it must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that
commerce. The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve
contingencies that must baffle all the efforts of political
arithmetic.
Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment in
politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war
founded upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable
it from guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of
other nations. A cloud has been for some time hanging over the
European world. If it should break forth into a storm, who can
insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would not be spent
upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce that we are
entirely out of its reach. Or if the combustible materials that now
seem to be collecting should be dissipated without coming to
maturity, or if a flame should be kindled without extending to us,
what security can we have that our tranquillity will long remain
undisturbed from some other course or from some other quarter? Let
us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our
option; that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot
count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition of
others. Who could have imagined at the conclusion of the last war
that France and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were,
would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other?
To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to
conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the
human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and
beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political
systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity, is to calculate
on the weaker springs of the human character.
What are the chief sources of expense in every government? What has
occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which several of
the European nations are oppressed? The answer plainly is, wars and
rebellions, the support of those institutions which are necessary to
guard the body politic against these two most mortal diseases of
society. The expenses arising from those institutions which are
relative to the mere domestic police of a state, to the support of
its legislative, executive, and judicial departments, with their
different appendages, and to the encouragement of agriculture and
manufactures (which will comprehend almost all the objects of state
expenditure), are insignificant in comparison with those which
relate to the national defence.
In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious
apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth
part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the class
of expenses last mentioned; the other fourteen fifteenths are
absorbed in the payment of the interest of debts contracted for
carrying on the wars in which that country has been engaged, and in
the maintenance of fleets and armies. If, on the one hand, it should
be observed that the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the
ambitious enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy are
not a proper standard by which to judge of those which might be
necessary in a republic, it ought, on the other hand, to be remarked
that there should be as great a disproportion between the profusion
and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its domestic
administration, and the frugality and economy which in that
particular become the modest simplicity of republican government. If
we balance a proper deduction from one side against that which it is
supposed ought to be made from the other, the proportion may still
be considered as holding good.
But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves
contracted in a single war, and let us only calculate on a common
share of the events which disturb the peace of nations, and we shall
instantly perceive, without the aid of any elaborate illustration,
that there must always be an immense disproportion between the
objects of federal and state expenditures. It is true that several
of the States, separately, are encumbered with considerable debts,
which are an excrescence of the late war. But this cannot happen
again, if the proposed system be adopted; and when these debts are
discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence, which the
State governments will continue to experience, will be for the mere
support of their respective civil lists, to which, if we add all
contingencies, the total amount in every State ought to fall
considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds.
In framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves, we
ought, in those provisions which are designed to be permanent, to
calculate, not on temporary, but on permanent causes of expense. If
this principle be a just one, our attention would be directed to a
provision in favor of the State governments for an annual sum of
about two hundred thousand pounds; while the exigencies of the Union
could be susceptible of no limits, even in imagination. In this view
of the subject, by what logic can it be maintained that the local
governments ought to command, in perpetuity, an EXCLUSIVE source of
revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two hundred thousand
pounds? To extend its power further, in exclusion of the authority
of the Union, would be to take the resources of the community out of
those hands which stood in need of them for the public welfare, in
order to put them into other hands which could have no just or
proper occasion for them.
Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed upon the
principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, between the
Union and its members, in proportion to their comparative
necessities; what particular fund could have been selected for the
use of the States, that would not either have been too much or too
little--too little for their present, too much for their future
wants? As to the line of separation between external and internal
taxes, this would leave to the States, at a rough computation, the
command of two thirds of the resources of the community to defray
from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses; and to the Union,
one third of the resources of the community, to defray from nine
tenths to nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If we desert this
boundary and content ourselves with leaving to the States an
exclusive power of taxing houses and lands, there would still be a
great disproportion between the means and the end; the possession of
one third of the resources of the community to supply, at most, one
tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been selected and
appropriated, equal to and not greater than the object, it would
have been inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the
particular States, and would have left them dependent on the Union
for a provision for this purpose.
The preceding train of observation will justify the position which
has been elsewhere laid down, that "A CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the
article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an entire
subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of State
authority to that of the Union." Any separation of the objects of
revenue that could have been fallen upon, would have amounted to a
sacrifice of the great INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the
individual States. The convention thought the concurrent
jurisdiction preferable to that subordination; and it is evident
that it has at least the merit of reconciling an indefinite
constitutional power of taxation in the Federal government with an
adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their
own necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this
important subject of taxation will claim a further consideration.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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