BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an indefinite
power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general remark;
which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national government, in
the article of revenue, should be restricted to particular objects,
it would naturally occasion an undue proportion of the public
burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils would spring form this
source: the oppression of particular branches of industry; and an
unequal distribution of the taxes, as well among the several States
as among the citizens of the same State.
Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of taxation
were to be confined to duties on imports, it is evident that the
government, for want of being able to command other resources, would
frequently be tempted to extend these duties to an injurious excess.
There are persons who imagine that they can never be carried to too
great a length; since the higher they are, the more it is alleged
they will tend to discourage an extravagant consumption, to produce
a favorable balance of trade, and to promote domestic manufactures.
But all extremes are pernicious in various ways. Exorbitant duties
on imported articles would beget a general spirit of smuggling;
which is always prejudicial to the fair trader, and eventually to
the revenue itself: they tend to render other classes of the
community tributary, in an improper degree, to the manufacturing
classes, to whom they give a premature monopoly of the markets; they
sometimes force industry out of its more natural channels into
others in which it flows with less advantage; and in the last place,
they oppress the merchant, who is often obliged to pay them himself
without any retribution from the consumer. When the demand is equal
to the quantity of goods at market, the consumer generally pays the
duty; but when the markets happen to be overstocked, a great
proportion falls upon the merchant, and sometimes not only exhausts
his profits, but breaks in upon his capital. I am apt to think that
a division of the duty, between the seller and the buyer, more often
happens than is commonly imagined. It is not always possible to
raise the price of a commodity in exact proportion to every
additional imposition laid upon it. The merchant, especially in a
country of small commercial capital, is often under a necessity of
keeping prices down in order to make a more expeditious sale.
The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener true
than the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more equitable
that the duties on imports should go into a common stock, than that
they should redound to the exclusive benefit of the importing
States. But it is not so generally true as to render it equitable,
that those duties should form the only national fund. When they are
paid by the merchant they operate as an additional tax upon the
importing State, whose citizens pay their proportion of them in the
character of consumers. In this view they are productive of
inequality among the States; which inequality would be increased
with the increased extent of the duties. The confinement of the
national revenues to this species of imposts would be attended with
inequality, from a different cause, between the manufacturing and
the non-manufacturing States. The States which can go farthest
towards the supply of their own wants, by their own manufactures,
will not, according to their numbers or wealth, consume so great a
proportion of imported articles as those States which are not in the
same favorable situation. They would not, therefore, in this mode
alone contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their
abilities. To make them do this it is necessary that recourse be had
to excises, the proper objects of which are particular kinds of
manufactures, New York is more deeply interested in these
considerations than such of her citizens as contend for limiting the
power of the Union to external taxation may be aware of. New York is
an importing State, and is not likely speedily to be, to any great
extent, a manufacturing State. She would, of course, suffer in a
double light from restraining the jurisdiction of the Union to
commercial imposts.
So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the
import duties being extended to an injurious extreme it may be
observed, conformably to a remark made in another part of these
papers, that the interest of the revenue itself would be a
sufficient guard against such an extreme. I readily admit that this
would be the case, as long as other resources were open; but if the
avenues to them were closed, HOPE, stimulated by necessity, would
beget experiments, fortified by rigorous precautions and additional
penalties, which, for a time, would have the intended effect, till
there had been leisure to contrive expedients to elude these new
precautions. The first success would be apt to inspire false
opinions, which it might require a long course of subsequent
experience to correct. Necessity, especially in politics, often
occasions false hopes, false reasoning, and a system of measures
correspondingly erroneous. But even if this supposed excess should
not be a consequence of the limitation of the federal power of
taxation, the inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though not
in the same degree, from the other causes that have been noticed.
Let us now return to the examination of objections.
One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition,
seems most to be relied on, is, that the House of Representatives is
not sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different
classes of citizens, in order to combine the interests and feelings
of every part of the community, and to produce a due sympathy
between the representative body and its constituents. This argument
presents itself under a very specious and seducing form, and is well
calculated to lay hold of the prejudices of those to whom it is
addressed. But when we come to dissect it with attention, it will
appear to be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The object
it seems to aim at is, in the first place, impracticable, and in the
sense in which it is contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for
another place the discussion of the question which relates to the
sufficiency of the representative body in respect to numbers, and
shall content myself with examining here the particular use which
has been made of a contrary supposition, in reference to the
immediate subject of our inquiries.
The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people,
by persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless it were
expressly provided in the Constitution, that each different
occupation should send one or more members, the thing would never
take place in practice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be
inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in
preference to persons of their own professions or trades. Those
discerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic and
manufacturing arts furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise
and industry. Many of them, indeed, are immediately connected with
the operations of commerce. They know that the merchant is their
natural patron and friend; and they are aware, that however great
the confidence they may justly feel in their own good sense, their
interests can be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by
themselves. They are sensible that their habits in life have not
been such as to give them those acquired endowments, without which,
in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural abilities are for
the most part useless; and that the influence and weight, and
superior acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a
contest with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the
public councils, unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading
interests. These considerations, and many others that might be
mentioned, prove, and experience confirms its, that artisans and
manufacturers will commonly be disposed to bestow their votes upon
merchants and those whom they recommend. We must therefore consider
merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the
community.
With regard to the learned professions, little need be observed;
they truly form no distinct interest in society, and, according to
their situation and talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of
the confidence and choice of each other, and of other parts of the
community.
Nothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a political
view, and particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be perfectly
united, from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No
tax can be laid on land which will not affect the proprietor of
millions of acres as well as the proprietor of a single acre. Every
landholder will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes
on land as low as possible; and common interest may always be
reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. But if we even could
suppose a distinction of interest between the opulent landholder and
the middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude, that the
first would stand a better chance of being deputed to the national
legislature than the last? If we take fact as our guide, and look
into our own senate and assembly, we shall find that moderate
proprietors of land prevail in both; nor is this less the case in
the senate, which consists of a smaller number, than in the
assembly, which is composed of a greater number.
Where the qualifications of the electors are the same, whether they
have to choose a small or a large number, their votes will fall upon
those in whom they have most confidence; whether these happen to be
men of large fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no property at
all.
It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should have
some of their own number in the representative body, in order that
their feelings and interests may be the better understood and
attended to. But we have seen that this will never happen under any
arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free. Where this is
the case, the representative body, with too few exceptions to have
any influence on the spirit of the government, will be composed of
landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions. But
where is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different
classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these
three descriptions of men? Will not the landholder know and feel
whatever will promote or insure the interest of landed property? And
will he not, from his own interest in that species of property, be
sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or encumber
it? Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate,
as far as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic and
manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly allied? Will
not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to
the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely
to prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either,
so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests
of the society?
If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions
which may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society, and
to which a wise administration will never be inattentive, is the man
whose situation leads to extensive inquiry and information less
likely to be a competent judge of their nature, extent, and
foundation than one of whose observation does not travel beyond the
circle of his neighbors and acquaintances? Is it not natural that a
man who is a candidate for the favor of the people, and who is
dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the
continuance of his public honors, should take care to inform himself
of their dispositions and inclinations, and should be willing to
allow them their proper degree of influence upon his conduct? This
dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself, and his
posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent, are the true,
and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the
representative and the constituent.
There is no part of the administration of government that requires
extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of
political economy so much as the business of taxation. The man who
understands those principles best will be least likely to resort to
oppressive expedients, or to sacrifice any particular class of
citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might be demonstrated
that the most productive system of finance will always be the least
burdensome. There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious
exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that the person
in whose hands it is should be acquainted with the general genius,
habits, and modes of thinking of the people at large, and with the
resources of the country. And this is all that can be reasonably
meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the people. In
any other sense the proposition has either no meaning, or an absurd
one. And in that sense let every considerate citizen judge for
himself where the requisite qualification is most likely to be
found.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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