WE HAVE seen that the result of the observations, to which the
foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the
natural operation of the different interests and views of the
various classes of the community, whether the representation of the
people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of
proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned
professions, who will truly represent all those different interests
and views. If it should be objected that we have seen other
descriptions of men in the local legislatures, I answer that it is
admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient
number to influence the general complexion or character of the
government. There are strong minds in every walk of life that will
rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command
the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which
they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The door
ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit of
human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants
flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation;
but occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning,
founded upon the general course of things, less conclusive.
The subject might be placed in several other lights that would all
lead to the same result; and in particular it might be asked, What
greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived between
the carpenter and blacksmith, and the linen manufacturer or
stocking-weaver, than between the merchant and either of them? It is
notorious that there are often as great rivalships between different
branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there are between
any of the departments of labor and industry, so that, unless the
representative body were to be far more numerous than would be
consistent with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its
deliberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the spirit of
the objection we have been considering should ever be realized in
practice. But I forbear to dwell any longer on a matter which has
hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit even of an accurate
inspection of its real shape or tendency.
There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature that
claims our attention. It has been asserted that a power of internal
taxation in the national legislature could never be exercised with
advantages, as well form the want of a sufficient knowledge of local
circumstances, as from an interference between the revenue laws of
the Union and of the particular States. The supposition of a want of
proper knowledge seems to be entirely destitute of foundation. If
any question is depending in a State legislature respecting one of
the counties, which demands a knowledge of local details, how is it
acquired? No doubt from the information of the members of the
county. Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national
legislature from the representatives of each State? And is it not to
be presumed that the men who will generally be sent there will be
possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence to be able to
communicate that information? Is the knowledge of local
circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute topographical
acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams, highways, and
by-paths in each State; or is it a general acquaintance with its
situation and resources, with the state of its agriculture,
commerce, manufactures, with the nature of its products and
consumptions, with the different degrees and kinds of its wealth,
property, and industry?
Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular kind,
usually commit the administration of their finances to single men or
to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and prepare, in
the first instance, the plans of taxation, which are afterwards
passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or legislature.
Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best
qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for
revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of mankind
can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge of
local circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation.
The taxes intended to be comprised under the general denomination of
internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the direct and those
of the indirect kind. Though the objection be made to both, yet the
reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the former branch. And
indeed, as to the latter, by which must be understood duties and
excises on articles of consumption, one is at a loss to conceive
what can be the nature of the difficulties apprehended. The
knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a kind that will
either be suggested by the nature of the article itself, or can
easily be procured from any well-informed man, especially of the
mercantile class. The circumstances that may distinguish its
situation in one State from its situation in another must be few,
simple, and easy to be comprehended. The principal thing to be
attended to, would be to avoid those articles which had been
previously appropriated to the use of a particular State; and there
could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue system of each.
This could always be known from the respective codes of laws, as
well as from the information of the members from the several States.
The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and lands,
appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in this
view it will not bear a close examination. Land-taxes are commonly
laid in one of two modes, either by actual valuations, permanent or
periodical, or by occasional assessments, at the discretion, or
according to the best judgment, of certain officers whose duty it is
to make them. In either case, the EXECUTION of the business, which
alone requires the knowledge of local details, must be devolved upon
discreet persons in the character of commissioners or assessors,
elected by the people or appointed by the government for the
purpose. All that the law can do must be to name the persons or to
prescribe the manner of their election or appointment, to fix their
numbers and qualifications and to draw the general outlines of their
powers and duties. And what is there in all this that cannot as well
be performed by the national legislature as by a State legislature?
The attention of either can only reach to general principles; local
details, as already observed, must be referred to those who are to
execute the plan.
But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be
placed that must be altogether satisfactory. The national
legislature can make use of the system of each State within that
State. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in
each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the
federal government.
Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not to
be left to the discretion of the national legislature, but is to be
determined by the numbers of each State, as described in the second
section of the first article. An actual census or enumeration of the
people must furnish the rule, a circumstance which effectually shuts
the door to partiality or oppression. The abuse of this power of
taxation seems to have been provided against with guarded
circumspection. In addition to the precaution just mentioned, there
is a provision that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be
UNIFORM throughout the United States.
It has been very properly observed by different speakers and writers
on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the power
of internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on experiment
to be really inconvenient, the federal government may then forbear
the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in its stead. By
way of answer to this, it has been triumphantly asked, Why not in
the first instance omit that ambiguous power, and rely upon the
latter source? Two solid answers may be given. The first is, that
the exercise of that power, if convenient, will be preferable,
because it will be more effectual; and it is impossible to prove in
theory, or otherwise than by the experiment, that it cannot be
advantageously exercised. The contrary, indeed, appears most
probable. The second answer is, that the existence of such a power
in the Constitution will have a strong influence in giving efficacy
to requisitions. When the States know that the Union can apply
itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for
exertion on their part.
As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of its
members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or
repugnancy of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal
sense, interfere with each other; and it is far from impossible to
avoid an interference even in the policy of their different systems.
An effectual expedient for this purpose will be, mutually to abstain
from those objects which either side may have first had recourse to.
As neither can control the other, each will have an obvious and
sensible interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And where there is
an immediate common interest, we may safely count upon its
operation. When the particular debts of the States are done away,
and their expenses come to be limited within their natural compass,
the possibility almost of interference will vanish. A small land-tax
will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their most simple
and most fit resource.
Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal
taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of
revenue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double
taxations, and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll
taxes, have been played off with all the ingenious dexterity of
political legerdemain.
As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be no
room for double sets of officers: one, where the right of imposing
the tax is exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the
duties on imports; the other, where the object has not fallen under
any State regulation or provision, which may be applicable to a
variety of objects. In other cases, the probability is that the
United States will either wholly abstain from the objects
preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the State
officers and State regulations for collecting the additional
imposition. This will best answer the views of revenue, because it
will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid any
occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people. At
all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an
inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than to show that
evils predicted do no necessarily result from the plan.
As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence, it
is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed; but
the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If such a
spirit should infest the councils of the Union, the most certain
road to the accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the State
officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an
accumulation of their emoluments. This would serve to turn the tide
of State influence into the channels of the national government,
instead of making federal influence flow in an opposite and adverse
current. But all suppositions of this kind or invidious, and ought
to be banished from the consideration of the great question before
the people. They can answer no other end than to cast a mist over
the truth.
As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain. The
wants of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to
be done by the authority of the federal government, it will not be
to be done by that of the State government. The quantity of taxes to
be paid by the community must be the same in either case; with this
advantage, if the provision is to be made by the Union--that the
capital resource of commercial imposts, which is the most convenient
branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a much greater
extent under federal than under State regulation, and of course will
render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and
with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real
difficulty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it
will impose a disposition to greater care in the choice and
arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to make it a fixed
point of policy in the national administration to go as far as may
be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the
public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those
impositions which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and
most numerous classes of the society. Happy it is when the interest
which the government has in the preservation of its own power,
coincides with a proper distribution of the public burdens, and
tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from
oppression!
As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of
them; and though they have prevailed from an early period in those
States (footnote 1.) which have uniformly been the most tenacious of
their rights, I should lament to see them introduced into practice
under the national government. But does it follow because there is a
power to lay them, that they will actually be laid? Every State in
the Union has power to impose taxes of this kind; and yet in several
of them they are unknown in practice. Are the State governments to
be stigmatized as tyrannies, because they possess this power? If
they are not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a
charge against the national government, or even be urged as an
obstacle to its adoption? As little friendly as I am to the species
of imposition, I still feel a thorough conviction that the power of
having recourse to it ought to exist in the federal government.
There are certain emergencies of nations, in which expedients, that
in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne, become
essential to the public weal. And the government, from the
possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of
making use of them. The real scarcity of objects in this country,
which may be considered as productive sources of revenue, is a
reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging the discretion of the
national councils in this respect. There may exist certain critical
and tempestuous conjunctures of the State, in which a poll tax may
become an inestimable resource. And as I know nothing to exempt this
portion of the globe from the common calamities that have befallen
other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that
is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon, which in
any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the general
defence and security.
I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers
proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be considered
as having an immediate relation to the energy of the government; and
have endeavored to answer the principal objections which have been
made to them. I have passed over in silence those minor authorities,
which are either too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of
the hostilities of the opponents of the Constitution, or of too
manifest propriety to admit of controversy. The mass of judiciary
power, however, might have claimed an investigation under this head,
had it not been for the consideration that its organization and its
extent may be more advantageously considered in connection. This has
determined me to refer it to the branch of our inquiries upon which
we shall next enter.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
Footnotes Explained:
Footnote Number 1. The New England States.
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