HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal
government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be
considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to
the portion of authority left in the several States.
The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of
considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely
necessary for the purposes of the federal government, have exhausted
themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of
the proposed degree of power to the governments of the particular
States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essential to the
security of the people of America against foreign danger; if it be
essential to their security against contentions and wars among the
different States; if it be essential to guard them against those
violent and oppressive factions which embitter the blessings of
liberty, and against those military establishments which must
gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be
essential to the happiness of the people of America, is it not
preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government, without which
the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government
may derogate from the importance of the governments of the
individual States. Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was
the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands
spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that
the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but
that the government of the individual States, that particular
municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and
be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We
have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people
were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine
to be revived in the New, in another shape--that the solid happiness
of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political
institutions of a different form? Is it too early for politicians to
presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of
the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued;
and that no form of government whatever has any other value than as
it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of
the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be,
Reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public
happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as
the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness
of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the
former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice is
necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue will be
endangered, is the question before us.
Several important considerations have been touched in the course of
these papers, which discountenance the supposition that the
operation of the federal government will by degrees prove fatal to
the State governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more
fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be
disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale.
We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and moderate
confederacies, the strongest tendency continually betraying itself
in the members, to despoil the general government of its
authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to
defend itself against the encroachments. Although, in most of these
examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under
consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the
latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain,
under the proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active
sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded. In
the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head had a degree
and species of power, which gave it a considerable likeness to the
government framed by the convention. The Lycian Confederacy, as far
as its principles and form are transmitted, must have borne a still
greater analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us that either of
them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one
consolidated government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of
one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority
to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the
subordinate authorities. These cases are the more worthy of our
attention, as the external cases by which the component parts were
pressed together were much more numerous and powerful than in our
case; and consequently less powerful ligaments within would be
sufficient to bind the members to the head, and to each other.
In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity exemplified.
Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance
between the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in
some instances between the general sovereign and the latter, it
usually happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the
rivalship for encroachments. Had no external dangers enforced
internal harmony and subordination, and particularly, had the local
sovereigns possessed the affections of the people, the great
kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as many independent
princes as there were formerly feudatory barons.
The State governments will have the advantage of the Federal
government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate
dependence of the one on the other; to the weight of personal
influence which each side will possess; to the powers respectively
vested in them; to the predilection and probable support of the
people; to the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating,
the measure of each other.
The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential
parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise
essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without
the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the
United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have
a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases,
of themselves determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely
and exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the House of
Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be
chosen very much under the influence of that class of men, whose
influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into
the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the
federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor
of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence,
which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than
too overbearing towards them.
On the other side, the component parts of the State governments will
in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct
agency of the federal government, and very little, it at all, to the
local influence of its members.
The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the
United States will be much smaller than the number employed under
the particular States. There will consequently be less of personal
influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members
of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen
and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia,
ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corporation,
and town officers, for three millions and more of people,
intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and
circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number
and influence, those of every description who will be employed in
the administration of the federal system. Compare the members of the
three great departments of the thirteen States, excluding from the
judiciary department the justices of peace, with the members of the
corresponding departments of the single government of the Union;
compare the militia officers of three millions of people with the
military and marine officers of any establishment which is within
the compass of probability, or, I may add of possibility, and in
this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage of the States to be
decisive.
If the federal government is to have collectors of revenue, the
State governments will have theirs also. And as those of the former
will be principally on the sea-coast, and not very numerous, whilst
those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and
will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the
same side. It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may
exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes
throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not
be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; than an
option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by
previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection,
under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made
by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the
several States. Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other
instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial power,
the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent
authority of the Union.
Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal
revenue should be appointed under the federal government, the
influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with that
of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale. Within
every district to which a federal collector would be allotted, there
would not be less than thirty or forty, or even more, officers of
different descriptions, and many of them persons of character and
weight, whose influence would lie on the side of the State.
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be
exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of
taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs; concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.
The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and
important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments
in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably
bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will
here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. The more
adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national
defence, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which
might favor their ascendancy over the governments of the particular
States.
If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it
will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less
in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration
of its ORIGINAL powers. The regulations of commerce, it is true, is
a new power; but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and
from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to
war and peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the
other more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing
Congress by the articles of Confederation. The proposed change does
not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode
of administering them. The change relating to taxation may be
regarded as the most important; and yet the present Congress have as
complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite supplies of
money for the common defence and general welfare, as the future
Congress will have to require them of individual citizens; and the
latter will be no more bound than the States themselves have been,
to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. Had the States
complied punctually with the articles of Confederation, or could
their compliance have been enforced by as peaceable means as many be
used with success towards single persons, our past experience is
very far from countenancing an opinion, that the State governments
would have lost their constitutional powers, and have gradually
undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain that such an event
would have ensued, would be to say at once, that the existence of
the State governments is incompatible with any system whatever that
accomplishes the essential purposes of the Union.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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