FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I
pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the
government. I shall begin with the House of Representatives.
The first view to be taken of this part of the government relates to
the qualifications of the electors and the elected.
Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of
the most numerous branch of the State legislature. The definition of
the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental
article of republican government. It was incumbent on the
convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the
Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of
the Congress, would have been improper for the reason just
mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the
States, would have been improper for the same reason; and for the
additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the
State governments that branch of the federal government which ought
to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different
qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule, would
probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it
would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by
the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within
their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is
conformable to the standard already established, or which may be
established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United
States, because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not
alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the
people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in
such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the
federal Constitution.
The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly
defined by the State constitutions, and being at the same time more
susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and
regulated by the convention. A representative of the United States
must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years
a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election,
be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the
time of his service, must be in no office under the United States.
Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the
federal government is open to merit of every description, whether
native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to
poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession or religious
faith.
The term for which the representatives are to be elected falls under
a second view which may be taken of this branch. In order to decide
on the propriety of this article, two questions must be considered:
first, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe;
secondly, whether they be necessary or useful.
First. As it is essential to liberty that the government in general
should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly
essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an
immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.
Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this
dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what
particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the
purpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise
calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances with
which it may be connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that
ought always to be followed whenever it can be found.
The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the
citizens in person, being at most but very imperfectly known to
ancient polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to
expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a
research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine
ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear
the greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which this
character ought to be applied, is the House of Commons in Great
Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution,
anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield
instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question among
political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent date prove
that parliaments were to sit only every year; not that they were to
be elected every year. And even these annual sessions were left so
much at the discretion of the monarch, that, under various pretexts,
very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal
ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in
the reign of Charles II., that the intermissions should not be
protracted beyond a period of three years.
On the accession of William III., when a revolution took place in
the government, the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it
was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the people, that
parliaments ought to be held frequently. By another statute, which
passed a few years later in the same reign, the term "frequently,'
which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of
Charles II., is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly
enacted that a new parliament shall be called within three years
after the termination of the former. The last change, from three to
seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early in
the present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian succession.
From these facts it appears that the greatest frequency of elections
which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom, for binding the
representatives to their constituents, does not exceed a triennial
return of them. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty
retained even under septennial elections, and all the other vicious
ingredients in the parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that
a reduction of the period from seven to three years, with the other
necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people
over their representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections,
under the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the
requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their
constituents.
Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by the
discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except on the
accession of a new prince, or some other contingent event. The
parliament which commenced with George II. was continued throughout
his whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The only
dependence of the representatives on the people consisted in the
right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies, by the election
of new members, and in the chance of some event which might produce
a general new election. The ability also of the Irish parliament to
maintain the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition
might exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over
the subjects of their deliberation. Of late, these shackles, if I
mistake not, have been broken; and octennial parliaments have
besides been established. What effect may be produced by this
partial reform, must be left to further experience. The example of
Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little light on the
subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be
that if the people of that country have been able under all these
disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of
biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty,
which might depend on a due connection between their representatives
and themselves.
Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States,
when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time
that it is so well known as to require little to be said on it. The
principle of representation, in one branch of the legislature at
least, was established in all of them. But the periods of election
were different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any
reason to infer, from the spirit and conduct of the representatives
of the people, prior to the Revolution, that biennial elections
would have been dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit which
everywhere displayed itself at the commencement of the struggle, and
which vanquished the obstacles to independence, is the best of
proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had been everywhere
enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its
proper enlargement. This remark holds good, as well with regard to
the then colonies whose elections were least frequent, as to those
whose elections were most frequent. Virginia was the colony which
stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great
Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public act, the
resolution of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not
been misinformed, elections under the former government were
septennial. This particular example is brought into view, not as a
proof of any peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was
probably accidental; and still less of any advantage in septennial
elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are
inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very
substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no
danger from biennial elections.
The conclusion resulting from these examples will be not a little
strengthened by recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that
the federal legislature will possess a part only of that supreme
legislative authority which is vested completely in the British
Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the
colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature.
It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no other
circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter
ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power,
the more safely may its duration be protracted.
In the second place, it has, on another occasion, been shown that
the federal legislature will not only be restrained by its
dependence on the people, as other legislative bodies are, but that
it will be, moreover, watched and controlled by the several
collateral legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not.
And in the third place, no comparison can be made between the means
that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the federal
government for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the
House of Representatives from their duty to the people, and the
means of influence over the popular branch possessed by the other
branches of the government above cited. With less power, therefore,
to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one
side, and will be doubly watched on the other.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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