I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that
where annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be true, as has
often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are
generally founded in reason, it is not less true, that when once
established, they are often applied to cases to which the reason of
them does not extend. I need not look for a proof beyond the case
before us. What is the reason on which this proverbial observation
is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule of
pretending that any natural connection subsists between the sun or
the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the
temptations of power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this
respect, confined to any single point of time; but lies within
extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations
which may be required by the various situations and circumstances of
civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were
found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily,
weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may
require a deviation from the rule on one side, why not also on the
other side? Turning our attention to the periods established among
ourselves, for the election of the most numerous branches of the
State legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in
this instance, than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In
Connecticut and Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the
other States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South
Carolina they are biennial--as is proposed in the federal
government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the
longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to show,
that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a
greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that
either the one or the other of these States is distinguished in
these respects, and by these causes, from the States whose elections
are different from both.
In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but
one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important
distinction so well understood in America, between a Constitution
established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a
law established by the government and alterable by the government,
seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other
country?
Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been
supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the
government. Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political
and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most
of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained that the
authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as
well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of
legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several instances,
actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental
articles of the government. They have in particular, on several
occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last
occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of triennial
elections, but by the same act, continued themselves in place four
years beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. An
attention to these dangerous practices has produced a very natural
alarm in the votaries of free government, of which frequency of
elections is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some
security to liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed.
Where no Constitution, paramount to the government, either existed
or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that
established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other
security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security
would the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some
simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the
danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for
uniting the patriotic exertions?
The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the
subject, was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been
inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the
gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the advance
towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure
from the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity can
there be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as the
federal government will be, by the authority of a paramount
Constitution?
Or who will pretend that the liberties of the people of America will
not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by
such a Constitution, than those of any other nation would be, where
elections were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to
alterations by the ordinary power of the government?
The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be
necessary or useful. The propriety of answering this question in the
affirmative will appear from several very obvious considerations.
No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright
intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the
subjects on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may
be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of
men in private as well as public stations. Another part can only be
attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in
the station which requires the use of it. The period of service,
ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the
extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of
the service. The period of legislative service established in most
of the States for the more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one
year. The question then may be put into this simple form: does the
period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge
requisite for federal legislation than one year does to the
knowledge requisite for State legislation? The very statement of the
question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given
to it.
In a single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing
laws, which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all the
citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of
the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very
diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversation of
every class of people.
The great theatre of the United States presents a very different
scene. The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in
every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread
throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified by
the local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be
correctly learned in any other place than in the central councils,
to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives
of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and
even of the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed by the
members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly
regulated by uniform laws, without some acquaintance with the
commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations of the
different States? How can the trade between the different States be
duly regulated without some knowledge of their relative situations
in these and other respects. How can taxes be judiciously imposed
and effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to the
different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in
the different States? How can uniform regulations for the militia be
duly provided, without a similar knowledge of many internal
circumstances by which the States are distinguished from each other?
These are the principal objects of federal legislation, and suggest
most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives
ought to acquire. The other interior objects will require a
proportional degree of information with regard to them.
It is true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very
much diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper
inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a
federal code. Improvements on the first draughts will every year
become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the government
will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members.
The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of
curiosity and conversation among the citizens at large. And the
increased intercourse among those of different States will
contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their
affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of
their manners and laws. But with all these abatements, the business
of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in
novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State,
as to justify the longer period of service assigned to those who are
to transact it.
A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal
representative, and which has not been mentioned, is that of foreign
affairs. In regulating our own commerce, he ought to be not only
acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other
nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other
nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the law of
nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal
legislation, is submitted to the federal government. And although
the House of Representatives is not immediately to participate in
foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from the necessary
connection between the several branches of public affairs, those
particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the
ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes demand particular
legislative sanction and cooperation. Some portion of this knowledge
may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also
can only be derived from the public sources of information; and all
of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to
the subject during the period of actual service in the legislature.
There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but
which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the
representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements
rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more serious
objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a single
year, than if extended to two years. No argument can be drawn on
this subject, from the case of the delegates to the existing
Congress. They are elected annually, it is true; but their
re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies almost as a
matter of course. The election of the representatives by the people
would not be governed by the same principle.
A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will
possess superior talents; will, by frequent re-elections, become
members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public
business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those
advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less
the information of the bulk of the members, the more apt will they
be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is
no less applicable to the relation which will subsist between the
House of Representatives and the Senate.
It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent
elections, even in single States, where they are large, and hold but
one legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be
investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due
effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful
means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of course, is sure
of holding it a sufficient time to answer his purposes. Hence, a
very pernicious encouragement is given to the use of unlawful means,
for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the federal
legislature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious
abuse, particularly in the more distant States. Each house is, as it
necessarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and
returns of its members; and whatever improvements may be suggested
by experience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in
disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably
elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his
seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little check to
unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.
All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming,
that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the
public, as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the
people.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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