THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist,
forms another and a very interesting point of view, under which this
branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any
article, indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more
worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent
force of argument with which it has been assailed. The charges
exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of
representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public
interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge
of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents; thirdly,
that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will
sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be
most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the
depression of the many; fourthly, that defective as the number will
be in the first instance, it will be more and more disproportionate,
by the increase of the people, and the obstacles which will prevent
a correspondent increase of the representatives.
In general it may be remarked on this subject, that no political
problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which
relates to the number most convenient for a representative
legislature; nor is there any point on which the policy of the
several States is more at variance, whether we compare their
legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider the
proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their
constituents. Passing over the difference between the smallest and
largest States, as Delaware, whose most numerous branch consists of
twenty-one representatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to
between three and four hundred, a very considerable difference is
observable among States nearly equal in population. The number of
representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of that
in the State last mentioned. New York, whose population is to that
of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one third of
the number of representatives. As great a disparity prevails between
the States of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania,
the representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their
constituents than of one for every four or five thousand. In Rhode
Island, they bear a proportion of at least one for every thousand.
And according to the constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be
carried to one to every ten electors; and must unavoidably far
exceed the proportion in any of the other States.
Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio between the
representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the
latter are very numerous as where they are very few. Were the
representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode
Island, they would, at this time, amount to between four and five
hundred; and twenty or thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the
other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of
Delaware, would reduce the representative assembly of the latter to
seven or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious than to found
our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or
seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of
power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven
hundred would be proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry
on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning
ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all cases a certain
number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free
consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a
combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number
ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid
the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous
assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to
wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a
Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were
applied to the case of biennial elections. For the same reason that
the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State
legislatures, justify less frequent election than the public safety
might otherwise require, the members of Congress need be less
numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and
were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other
legislative bodies.
With these general ideas in our minds, let us weigh the objections
which have been stated against the number of members proposed for
the House of Representatives. It is said, in the first place, that
so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power.
The number of which this branch of the legislature is to consist, at
the outset of the government, will be sixty-five. Within three years
a census is to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for
every thirty thousand inhabitants; and within every successive
period of ten years the census is to be renewed, and augmentations
may continue to be made under the above limitation. It will not be
thought an extravagant conjecture that the first census will, at the
rate of one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of
representatives to at least one hundred. Estimating the negroes in
the proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted that the
population of the United States will by that time, if it does not
already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of twenty-five
years, according to the computed rate of increase, the number of
representatives will amount to two hundred; and of fifty years, to
four hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will put an end to
all fears arising from the smallness of the body. I take for granted
here what I shall, in answering the fourth objection, hereafter
show, that the number of representatives will be augmented from time
to time in the manner provided by the Constitution. On a contrary
supposition, I should admit the objection to have very great weight
indeed.
The true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of
the number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public
liberty? Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a hundred
or two hundred for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited
and well-guarded power of legislating for the United States?
I must own that I could not give a negative answer to this question,
without first obliterating every impression which I have received
with regard to the present genius of the people of America, the
spirit which actuates the State legislatures, and the principles
which are incorporated with the political character of every class
of citizens.
I am unable to conceive that the people of America, in their present
temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will
choose, and every second year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a
hundred men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of
tyranny or treachery.
I am unable to conceive that the State legislatures, which must feel
so many motives to watch, and which possess so many means of
counteracting the federal legislature, would fail either to detect
or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of
their common constituents. I am equally unable to conceive that
there are at this time, or can be in any short time, in the United
States, any sixty-five or a hundred men capable of recommending
themselves to the choice of the people at large, who would either
desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the
solemn trust committed to them. What change of circumstances, time,
and a fuller population of our country may produce, requires a
prophetic spirit to declare, which makes so part of my pretensions.
But judging from the circumstances now before us, and from the
probable state of them within a moderate period of time, I must
pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the
number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution.
From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign
gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and
enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it
happened that we are at this time a free and independent nation? The
congress which conducted us through the Revolution was a less
numerous body than their successors will be; they were chosen by,
nor responsible to, their fellow-citizens at large; though appointed
from year to year, and recallable at pleasure, they were generally
continued for three years, and, prior to the ratification of the
federal articles, for a still longer term. They held their
consultations always under the veil of secrecy; they had the sole
transaction of our affairs with foreign nations; through the whole
course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their
hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our future
representatives; and from the greatness of the prize at stake, and
the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well be supposed
that the use of other means than force would not have been scrupled.
Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not
betrayed; nor has the purity of our public councils in this
particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.
Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal
government? But where are the means to be found by the President, or
the Senate, or both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be
presumed, will not, and without a previous corruption of the House
of Representatives cannot, more than suffice for very different
purposes; their private fortunes, as they must all be American
citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger.
The only means, then, which they can possess, will be in the
dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her
charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be
exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate.
Now, the fidelity of the other House is to be the victim. The
improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the
several members of government, standing on as different foundations
as republican principles will well admit, and at the same time
accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone
to quiet this apprehension.
But, fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still further
safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to
any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments
may be increased, during the term of their election. No offices
therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may
become vacant by ordinary casualties; and to suppose that these
would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the people,
selected by the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by
which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an
indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must
be vain. The sincere friends of liberty, who give themselves up to
the extravagancies of this passion, are not aware of the injury they
do their own cause.
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a
certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other
qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem
in confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of
these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the
pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some
among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference
would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for
self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism
can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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