The SECOND charge against the House of Representatives is, that it
will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its
constituents.
As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the
proposed number of representatives with the great extent of the
United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the diversity of
their interests, without taking into view at the same time the
circumstances which will distinguish the Congress from other
legislative bodies, the best answer that can be given to it will be
a brief explanation of these peculiarities.
It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought
to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his
constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those
circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the
representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and
particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of
legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due
performance of the legislative trust. In determining the extent of
information required in the exercise of a particular authority,
recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that
authority.
What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are
of most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge,
are commerce, taxation, and the militia.
A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has
been elsewhere remarked; but as far as this information relates to
the laws and local situation of each individual State, a very few
representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the
federal councils.
Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be
involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark
is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist of internal
collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the circumstances of the
State may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in
sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, diffusively elected
within the State? Divide the largest State into ten or twelve
districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local
interests in either, which will not be within the knowledge of the
representative of the district. Besides this source of information,
the laws of the State, framed by representatives from every part of
it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every State
there have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations on
this subject which will, in many cases, leave little more to be done
by the federal legislature, than to review the different laws, and
reduce them in one general act. A skillful individual in his closet,
with all the local codes before him, might compile a law on some
subjects of taxation for the whole Union, without any aid from oral
information, and it may be expected that whenever internal taxes may
be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity
throughout the States, the more simple objects will be preferred. To
be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to this branch
of federal legislation by the assistance of the State codes, we need
only suppose for a moment that this or any other State were divided
into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a
power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of local
information and preparatory labor would be found in the several
volumes of their proceedings, which would very much shorten the
labors of the general legislature, and render a much smaller number
of members sufficient for it?
The federal councils will derive great advantage from another
circumstance. The representatives of each State will not only bring
with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local
knowledge of their respective districts, but will probably in all
cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members,
of the State legislature, where all the local information and
interests of the State are assembled, and from whence they may
easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the
United States.
The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater
force to the case of the militia. For however different the rules of
discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout
each particular State; and depend on circumstances which can differ
but little in different parts of the same State.
The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used, to
prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does
not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion
with regard to the extensive information which the representatives
ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring
it. This information, so far as it may relate to local objects, is
rendered necessary and difficult, not by a difference of laws and
local circumstances within a single State, but of those among
different States. Taking each State by itself, its laws are the
same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men,
therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper
representation of them.
Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly
simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a
knowledge of them in every other, and the whole State might be
competently represented by a single member taken from any part of
it. On a comparison of the different States together, we find a
great dissimilarity in their laws, and in many other circumstances
connected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which
the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst
a few representatives, therefore, from each State, may bring with
them a due knowledge of their own State, every representative will
have much information to acquire concerning all the other States.
The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative
situation of the different States, will have an assimilating effect.
The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States, taken
singly, will be just the contrary. At present some of the States are
little more than a society of husbandmen. Few of them have made much
progress in those branches of industry which give a variety and
complexity to the affairs of a nation. These, however, will in all
of them be the fruits of a more advanced population; and will
require, on the part of each State, a fuller representation. The
foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that the
progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of
the representative branch of the government.
The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind so many
political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and
which has been frequently consulted in the course of these
inquiries, corroborates the result of the reflections which we have
just made. The number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England
and Scotland cannot be stated at less than eight million. The
representatives of these eight millions in the House of Commons
amount to five hundred and fifty-eight. Of this number, one ninth
are elected by three hundred and sixty-four persons, and one half,
by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three persons. (footnote
1.) It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, and who do not
even reside among the people at large, can add anything either to
the security of the people against the government, or to the
knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the legislative
councils. On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are more
frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive
magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights.
They might therefore, with great propriety, be considered as
something more than a mere deduction from the real representatives
of the nation. We will, however, consider them in this light alone,
and will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of
others, who do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly
connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of
their affairs. With all these concessions, two hundred and
seventy-nine persons only will be the depositary of the safety,
interest, and happiness of eight millions--that is to say, there
will be one representative only to maintain the rights and explain
the situation of twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy
constituents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive
influence, and extending its authority to every object of
legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree
diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that a
valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these
circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are
chargeable, in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the
legislature concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to
this case the weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that
of the House of Representatives as above explained, it seems to give
the fullest assurance, that a representative for every thirty
thousand inhabitants will render the latter both a safe and
competent guardian of the interests which will be confided to it.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
Footnotes Explained:
Footnote Number 1. Burgh's "Political Disquisitions."
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