THE THIRD charge against the House of Representatives is, that it
will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least
sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at
an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few.
Of all the objections which have been framed against the federal
Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the
objection itself is levelled against a pretended oligarchy, the
principle of it strikes at the very root of republican government.
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most
virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next
place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them
virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The
elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of
republican government.
The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their
degeneracy are numerous and various. The most effectual one, is such
a limitation of the term of appointments as will maintain a proper
responsibility to the people.
Let me now ask what circumstance there is in the constitution of the
House of Representatives that violates the principles of republican
government, or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the
many? Let me ask whether every circumstance is not, on the contrary,
strictly conformable to these principles, and scrupulously impartial
to the rights and pretensions of every class and description of
citizens?
Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the
rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant;
not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble
sons of obscurity and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be
the great body of the people of the United States. They are to be
the same who exercise the right in every State of electing the
corresponding branch of the legislature of the State.
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose
merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his country.
No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of
civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint
the inclination of the people.
If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free suffrages
of their fellow-citizens may confer the representative trust, we
shall find it involving every security which can be devised or
desired for their fidelity to their constituents.
In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the
preference of their fellow-citizens, we are to presume that in
general they will be somewhat distinguished also by those qualities
which entitle them to it, and which promise a sincere and scrupulous
regard to the nature of their engagements.
In the second place, they will enter into the public service under
circumstances which cannot fail to produce a temporary affection at
least to their constituents. There is in every breast a sensibility
to marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which,
apart from all considerations of interest is some pledge for
grateful and benevolent returns. Ingratitude is a common topic of
declamation against human nature; and it must be confessed that
instances of it are but too frequent and flagrant, both in public
and in private life. But the universal and extreme indignation which
it inspires is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the
contrary sentiment.
In the third place, those ties which bind the representative to his
constituents are strengthened by motives of a more selfish nature.
His pride and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors
his pretensions and gives him a share in its honors and
distinctions. Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained by a
few aspiring characters, it must generally happen that a great
proportion of the men deriving their advancement from their
influence with the people, would have more to hope from a
preservation of the favor, than from innovations in the government
subversive of the authority of the people.
All these securities, however, would be found very insufficient
without the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth
place, the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support
in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the
people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode
of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they
will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to
cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and when they
must descend to the level from which they were raised; there forever
to remain unless a faithful discharge of their trust shall have
established their title to a renewal of it.
I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of
Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures, that
they can make no law which will not have its full operation on
themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the
society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by
which human policy can connect the rulers and the people together.
It creates between them that communion of interests and sympathy of
sentiments, of which few governments have furnished examples; but
without which every government degenerates into tyranny.
If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives
from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a
particular class of the society? I answer: the genius of the whole
system; the nature of just and constitutional laws; and above all,
the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of
America--a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is
nourished by it.
If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not
obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the people
will be prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty.
Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and
their constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself, are
the chords by which they will be bound to fidelity and sympathy with
the great mass of the people. It is possible that these may all be
insufficient to control the caprice and wickedness of man. But are
they not all that government will admit, and that human prudence can
devise? Are they not the genuine and the characteristic means by
which republican government provides for the liberty and happiness
of the people? Are they not the identical means on which every State
government in the Union relies for the attainment of these important
ends? What then are we to understand by the objection which this
paper has combated? What are we to say to the men who profess the
most flaming zeal for republican government, yet boldly impeach the
fundamental principle of it; who pretend to be champions for the
right and the capacity of the people to choose their own rulers, yet
maintain that they will prefer those only who will immediately and
infallibly betray the trust committed to them?
Were the objection to be read by one who had not seen the mode
prescribed by the Constitution for the choice of representatives, he
could suppose nothing less than that some unreasonable qualification
of property was annexed to the right of suffrage; or that the right
of eligibility was limited to persons of particular families or
fortunes; or at least that the mode prescribed by the State
constitutions was, in some respect or other, very grossly departed
from. We have seen how far such a supposition would err, as to the
two first points. Nor would it, in fact, be less erroneous as to the
last. The only difference discoverable between the two cases is,
that each representative of the United States will be elected by
five or six thousand citizens; whilst in the individual States, the
election of a representative is left to about as many hundreds. Will
it be pretended that this difference is sufficient to justify an
attachment to the State governments, and an abhorrence to the
federal government? If this be the point on which the objection
turns, it deserves to be examined.
Is it supported by reason? This cannot be said, without maintaining
that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a
fit representative, or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one,
than five or six hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us, that
as in so great a number a fit representative would be most likely to
be found, so the choice would be less likely to be diverted from him
by the intrigues of the ambitious or the bribes of the rich.
Is the consequence from this doctrine admissible? If we say that
five or six hundred citizens are as many as can jointly exercise
their right of suffrage, must we not deprive the people of the
immediate choice of their public servants, in every instance where
the administration of the government does not require as many of
them as will amount to one for that number of citizens?
Is the doctrine warranted by facts? It was shown in the last paper,
that the real representation in the British House of Commons very
little exceeds the proportion of one for every thirty thousand
inhabitants. Besides a variety of powerful causes not existing here,
and which favor in that country the pretensions of rank and wealth,
no person is eligible as a representative of a county, unless he
possess real estate of the clear value of six hundred pounds
sterling per year; nor of a city or borough, unless he possess a
like estate of half that annual value. To this qualification on the
part of the county representatives is added another on the part of
the county electors, which restrains the right of suffrage to
persons having a freehold estate of the annual value of more than
twenty pounds sterling, according to the present rate of money.
Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances, and notwithstanding
some very unequal laws in the British code, it cannot be said that
the representatives of the nation have elevated the few on the ruins
of the many.
But we need not resort to foreign experience on this subject. Our
own is explicit and decisive. The districts in New Hampshire in
which the senators are chosen immediately by the people, are nearly
as large as will be necessary for her representatives in the
Congress. Those of Massachusetts are larger than will be necessary
for that purpose; and those of New York still more so. In the last
State the members of Assembly for the cities and counties of New
York and Albany are elected by very nearly as many voters as will be
entitled to a representative in the Congress, calculating on the
number of sixty-five representatives only. It makes no difference
that in these senatorial districts and counties a number of
representatives are voted for by each elector at the same time. If
the same electors at the same time are capable of choosing four or
five representatives, they cannot be incapable of choosing one.
Pennsylvania is an additional example. Some of her counties, which
elect her State representatives, are almost as large as her
districts will be by which her federal representatives will be
elected. The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between
fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will therefore form nearly two
districts for the choice of federal representatives. It forms,
however, but one country, in which every elector votes for each of
its representatives in the State legislature. And what may appear to
be still more directly to our purpose, the whole city actually
elects a single member for the executive council. This is the case
in all the other counties of the State.
Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy
which has been employed against the branch of the federal government
under consideration? Has it appeared on trial that the senators of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, or the executive council
of Pennsylvania, or the members of the Assembly in the two last
States, have betrayed any peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many
to the few, or are in any respect less worthy of their places than
the representatives and magistrates appointed in other States by
very small divisions of the people?
But there are cases of a stronger complexion than any which I have
yet quoted. One branch of the legislature of Connecticut is so
constituted that each member of it is elected by the whole State. So
is the governor of that State, of Massachusetts, and of this State,
and the president of New Hampshire. I leave every man to decide
whether the result of any one of these experiments can be said to
countenance a suspicion, that a diffusive mode of choosing
representatives of the people tends to elevate traitors and to
undermine the public liberty.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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