THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which I
am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of
members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of
population may demand.
It has been admitted, that this objection, if well supported, would
have great weight. The following observations will show that, like
most other objections against the Constitution, it can only proceed
from a partial view of the subject, or from a jealousy which
discolors and disfigures every object which is beheld.
(1.) Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected that
the federal Constitution will not suffer by a comparison with the
State constitutions, in the security provided for a gradual
augmentation of the number of representatives. The number which is
to prevail in the first instance is declared to be temporary. Its
duration is limited to the short term of three years. Within every
successive term of ten years a census of inhabitants is to be
repeated. The unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first,
to readjust, from time to time, the apportionment of representatives
to the number of inhabitants, under the single exception that each
State shall have one representative at least; secondly, to augment
the number of representatives at the same periods, under the sole
limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for every
thirty thousand inhabitants. If we review the constitutions of the
several States, we shall find that some of them contain no
determinate regulations on this subject, that others correspond
pretty much on this point with the federal Constitution, and that
the most effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a mere
directory provision.
(2.) As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a gradual
increase of representatives under the State constitutions has at
least kept pace with that of the constituents, and it appears that
the former have been as ready to concur in such measures as the
latter have been to call for them.
(3.) There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which
insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the people and of
their representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the
latter. The peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of the
legislature is a representation of citizens, the other of the
States: in the former, consequently, the larger States will have
most weight; in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the
smaller States. From this circumstance it may with certainty be
inferred that the larger States will be strenuous advocates for
increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature in
which their influence predominates. And it so happens that four only
of the largest will have a majority of the whole votes in the House
of Representatives. Should the representatives or people, therefore,
of the smaller States oppose at any time a reasonable addition of
members, a coalition of a very few States will be sufficient to
overrule the opposition; a coalition which, notwithstanding the
rivalship and local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary
occasions, would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by
common interest, but justified by equity and the principles of the
Constitution.
It may be alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be prompted by
like motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would
be indispensable, the just and constitutional views of the other
branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has probably
created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous friends of a
numerous representation. Fortunately it is among the difficulties
which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a close and accurate
inspection. The following reflections will, if I mistake not, be
admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory on this point.
Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the
two houses on all legislative subjects, except the originating of
money bills, it cannot be doubted that the House, composed of the
greater number of members, when supported by the more powerful
States, and speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of
the people, will have no small advantage in a question depending on
the comparative firmness of the two houses.
This advantage must be increased by the consciousness, felt by the
same side, of being supported in its demands by right, by reason,
and by the Constitution; and the consciousness, on the opposite
side, of contending against the force of all these solemn
considerations.
It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation between the
smallest and largest States, there are several, which, though most
likely in general to arrange themselves among the former, are too
little removed in extent and population from the latter, to second
an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it is
by no means certain that a majority of votes, even in the Senate,
would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number of
representatives.
It will not be looking too far to add, that the senators from all
the new States may be gained over to the just views of the House of
Representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked. As
these States will, for a great length of time, advance in population
with peculiar rapidity, they will be interested in frequent
reapportionments of the representatives to the number of
inhabitants. The large States, therefore, who will prevail in the
House of Representatives, will have nothing to do but to make
reapportionments and augmentations mutually conditions of each
other; and the senators from all the most growing States will be
bound to contend for the latter, by the interest which their States
will feel in the former.
These considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject,
and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been
indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should all
be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States,
or their predominant influence in the councils of the Senate, a
constitutional and infallible resource still remains with the larger
States, by which they will be able at all times to accomplish their
just purposes. The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but
they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of
government. They, in a word, hold the purse--that powerful
instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British
Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people
gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and
finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the
overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government.
This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most
complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm
the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress
of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and
salutary measure.
But will not the House of Representatives be as much interested as
the Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions,
and will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or
its reputation on the pliancy of the Senate? Or, if such a trial of
firmness between the two branches were hazarded, would not the one
be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions will
create no difficulty with those who reflect that in all cases the
smaller the number, and the more permanent and conspicuous the
station, of men in power, the stronger must be the interest which
they will individually feel in whatever concerns the government.
Those who represent the dignity of their country in the eyes of
other nations, will be particularly sensible to every prospect of
public danger, or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To
those causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British
House of Commons over the other branches of the government, whenever
the engine of a money bill has been employed. An absolute
inflexibility on the side of the latter, although it could not have
failed to involve every department of the state in the general
confusion, has neither been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost
degree of firmness that can be displayed by the federal Senate or
President, will not be more than equal to a resistance in which they
will be supported by constitutional and patriotic principles.
In this review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives,
I have passed over the circumstances of economy, which, in the
present state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening
the temporary number of representatives, and a disregard of which
would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against the
Constitution as has been shown by the smallness of the number
proposed. I omit also any remarks on the difficulty which might be
found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the federal
service a large number of such characters as the people will
probably elect. One observation, however, I must be permitted to add
on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very serious
attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater the
number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will in
fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more numerous
an assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is
known to be the ascendancy of passion over reason.
In the next place, the larger the number, the greater will be the
proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities.
Now, it is precisely on characters of this description that the
eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their
force. In the ancient republics, where the whole body of the people
assembled in person, a single orator, or an artful statesman, was
generally seen to rule with as complete a sway as if a sceptre had
been placed in his single hand. On the same principle, the more
multitudinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the more it
will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of
the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the
slave of sophistry and declamation.
The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying
their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the
barrier against the government of a few. Experience will forever
admonish them that, on the contrary, after securing a sufficient
number for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of
diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract
their own views by every addition to their representatives. The
countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the
soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be
enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the
springs by which its motions are directed.
As connected with the objection against the number of
representatives, may properly be here noticed, that which has been
suggested against the number made competent for legislative
business. It has been said that more than a majority ought to have
been required for a quorum; and in particular cases, if not in all,
more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. That some
advantages might have resulted form such a precaution, cannot be
denied. It might have been an additional shield to some particular
interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and partial
measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the
inconveniences in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or
the general good might require new laws to be passed, or active
measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government
would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would
rule: the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the
defensive privilege limited to particular cases, an interested
minority might take advantage of it to screen themselves from
equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or, in particular
emergencies, to extort unreasonable indulgences. Lastly, it would
facilitate and foster the baneful practice of secessions; a practice
which has shown itself even in States where a majority only is
required; a practice subversive of all the principles of order and
regular government; a practice which leads more directly to public
convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other
which has yet been displayed among us.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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