HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives,
and answered such of the objections against it as seemed to merit
notice, I enter next on the examination of the Senate.
The heads into which this member of the government may be considered
are: I. The qualifications of senators; II. The appointment of them
by the State legislatures; III. The equality of representation in
the Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the term for which they
are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate.
I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from
those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a
longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age
at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former
must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for
the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the
nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of
information and stability of character, requires at the same time
that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to
supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in
transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who
are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits
incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years
appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of
adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the
public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of
them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the
national councils.
II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of
senators by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which
might have been devised for constituting this branch of the
government, that which has been proposed by the convention is
probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is
recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select
appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency
in the formation of the federal government as must secure the
authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the
two systems.
III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point,
which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite
pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for
much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people
thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought to
have a proportional share in the government, and that among
independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league,
the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an equal share
in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason
that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and
federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture
of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it
is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the
Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of
theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and
concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered
indispensable." A common government, with powers equal to its
objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the
political situation, of America. A government founded on principles
more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to
be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the
former, lies between the proposed government and a government still
more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence
must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a
fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to
contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify
the sacrifice.
In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to
each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of
sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument
for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought
to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States;
since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible
expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one
simple republic.
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the Constitution
of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against
improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed
without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and
then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this
complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious
as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defence which it
involves in favor of the smaller States, would be more rational, if
any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other
States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the
larger States will always be able, by their power over the supplies,
to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser
States, and as the facility and excess of lawmaking seem to be the
diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not
impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient
in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.
IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment,
come next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on
both these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes
which are to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain
these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which a
republic must suffer from the want of such an institution.
First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though
in a less degree than to other governments, that those who
administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents,
and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of
view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly,
distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all
cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to
the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in
schemes of usurpation of perfidy, where the ambition or corruption
of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded
on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United
States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I
will barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister
combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the
genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them
from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due
harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of
republican government.
Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the
propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the
impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by
factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.
Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from
proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of
other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need
not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is to
correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and
consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to
possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority
by a tenure of considerable duration.
Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of
due acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It
is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part
from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a
short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals
of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the
comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to
themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of
their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds,
that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to
be charged on the blunders of our governments; and that these have
proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of the
authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and
amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so
many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited
by each succeeding against each preceding session; so many
admonitions to the people, of the value of those aids which may be
expected from a well-constituted senate?
A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object
of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a
knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained.
Some governments are deficient in both these qualities; most
governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert,
that in American governments too little attention has been paid to
the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and what
merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which
increases the security for the first.
Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid
succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points
out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable
institution in the government. Every new election in the States is
found to change one half of the representatives. From this change of
men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a change of
opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good
measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every
prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and
becomes more just, as well as more important, in national
transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government, would fill
a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to
be a source of innumerable others.
In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other
nations, and all the advantages connected with national character.
An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his plans, or
perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is marked
at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own
unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity him,
but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a
few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of his.
One nation is to another what one individual is to another; with
this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of
the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints
also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretion of each
other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of
wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can be
sustained form the more systematic policy of their wiser neighbors.
But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to
America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is
held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her
enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an
interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed
affairs.
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous.
It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little
avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own
choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so
incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or
revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant
changes that no man, who knows what the law is today, can guess what
it will be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how
can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?
Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage
it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few
over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people. Every new
regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any manner
affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a
new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its
consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils
and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a
state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws
are made for the few, not for the many.
In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable
government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps
every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend
on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant
will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows
not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be
executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the
encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment,
when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and
advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government?
In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go
forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national
policy.
But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of
attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people,
towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity;
and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government,
any more than an individual, will long be respected without being
truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a
certain portion of order and stability.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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