A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the
want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and
stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will
not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy,
proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the national
councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the
world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than
it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every
government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the
merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on
various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the
offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in
doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be
warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or
known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can
be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with
foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have
avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every
instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would
probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?
Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is
evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous
and changeable body. it can only be found in a number so small that
a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be
the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably
invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its
members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and
prosperity of the community. The half-yearly representatives of
Rhode Island would probably have been little affected in their
deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments
drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by
foreign nations, or even by the sister States; whilst it can
scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence of a select and stable
body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone would
have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is
now laboring.
I add, as a sixth defect, the want, in some important cases, of a
due responsibility in the government to the people, arising from
that frequency of elections which in other cases produces this
responsibility. This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but
paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained,
to be as undeniable as it is important.
Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to
objects within the power of the responsible party, and in order to
be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a
ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents.
The objects of government may be divided into two general classes:
the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and
sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of
well-chosen and well-connected measures, which have a gradual and
perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter
description to the collective and permanent welfare of every
country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident that an
assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more
than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general
welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the
final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one
year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements
which could not be accomplished in less than half dozen years. Nor
is it possible for the people to estimate the share of influence
which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events
resulting form the mixed transactions of several years.
It is sufficiently difficult to preserve a personal responsibility
in the members of a numerous body, for such acts of the body as have
an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents.
The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the
legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to
provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a
train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the
attainment of those objects.
Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the
necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the
representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by
prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall
not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes
necessary as a defence to the people against their own temporary
errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the
community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free
governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so
there are particular moments in public affairs when the people,
stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or
misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call
for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready
to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will
be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of
citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the
blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason,
justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?
What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often
escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard
against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might
then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same
citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.
It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region
cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject
to the infection of violent passions, or to the danger of combining
in pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a
distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the contrary,
endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is one of the
principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same
time, this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the
use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same
extended situation, which will exempt the people of America from
some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them
to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the
influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of
interested men may succeed in distributing among them.
It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect
that history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a
senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only states to
whom that character can be applied. In each of the two first there
was a senate for life. The constitution of the senate in the last is
less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it probable that it was
not different in this particular from the two others. It is at least
certain, that it had some quality or other which rendered it an
anchor against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller council,
drawn out of the senate, was appointed not only for life, but filled
up vacancies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the
imitation, as they are repugnant to the genius, of America, are,
notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and turbulent
existence of other ancient republics, very instructive proofs of the
necessity of some institution that will blend stability with
liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the
American from other popular governments, as well ancient as modern;
and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in reasoning from
one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this
consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many
points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our
attention. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be
supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a numerous
assembly frequently elected by the people, and to the people
themselves. There are others peculiar to the former, which require
the control of such an institution.
The people can never wilfully betray their own interests; but they
may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and
the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative
trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the
concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every
public act.
The difference most relied on, between the American and other
republics, consists in the principle of representation; which is the
pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have been
unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them. The
use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings contained
in former papers, will have shown that I am disposed neither to deny
its existence nor to undervalue its importance. I feel the less
restraint, therefore, in observing, that the position concerning the
ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject of
representation, is by no means precisely true in the latitude
commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which
here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts, in
support of what I advance.
In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive
functions were performed, not by the people themselves, but by
officers elected by the people, and representing the people in their
executive capacity.
Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine Archons,
annually elected by the people at large. The degree of power
delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to
that period, we find an assembly, first of four, and afterwards of
six hundred members, annually elected by the people; and partially
representing them in their legislative capacity, since they were not
only associated with the people in the function of making laws, but
had the exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to
the people. The senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its
power, or the duration of its appointment, appears to have been
elective by the suffrages of the people. Similar instances might be
traced in most, if not all the popular governments of antiquity.
Lastly, in sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the
Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in numbers, but annually elected
by the whole body of the people, and considered as the
representatives of the people, almost in their plenipotentiary
capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by the
people, and have been considered by some authors as an institution
analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only,
that in the election of that representative body the right of
suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people.
From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear
that the principle of representation was neither unknown to the
ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions. The
true distinction between these and the American government, lies in
the total exclusion of the people, in their collective capacity,
from any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of the
representatives of the people from the administration of the former.
The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave
a most advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But
to insure to this advantage its full effect, we must be careful not
to separate it from the other advantage, of an extensive territory.
For it cannot be believed, that any form of representative
government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by
the democracies of Greece.
In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated
by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous
adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself with
repeating, that a senate appointed not immediately by the people,
and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous
preeminence in the government, and finally transform it into a
tyrannical aristocracy.
To this general answer, the general reply ought to be sufficient,
that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as
by the abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the
former as well as of the latter; and that the former, rather than
the latter, are apparently most to be apprehended by the United
States. But a more particular reply may be given.
Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be
observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt
the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of
Representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large. It is
evident that the Senate must be first corrupted before it can
attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State
legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the
periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole
body. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on
the House of Representatives, the opposition of that co-equal branch
of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without
corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new
representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine
order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself that the
proposed Senate can, by any possible means within the compass of
human address, arrive at the object of lawless ambition, through all
these obstructions?
If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by
experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most apposite
example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the federal Senate
will be, indirectly by the people, and for a term less by one year
only than the federal Senate. It is distinguished, also, by the
remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies within the
term of its appointment, and, at the same time, is not under the
control of any such rotation as is provided for the federal Senate.
There are some other lesser distinctions, which would expose the
former to colorable objections, that do not lie against the latter.
If the federal Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which
has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like
danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate of
Maryland, but no such symptoms have appeared. On the contrary, the
jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with
those who view with terror the correspondent part of the federal
Constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the progress of
the experiment; and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving,
from the salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in
which it will probably not be rivalled by that of any State in the
Union.
But if any thing could silence the jealousies on this subject, it
ought to be the British example. The Senate there, instead of being
elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to
particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary assembly of
opulent nobles. The House of Representatives, instead of being
elected for two years, and by the whole body of the people, is
elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion, by a very
small proportion of the people. Here, unquestionably, ought to be
seen in full display the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which
are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States.
Unfortunately, however, for the anti-federal argument, the British
history informs us that this hereditary assembly has not been able
to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of
Representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the
monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular
branch.
As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its examples
support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta, the Ephori,
the annual representatives of the people, were found an overmatch
for the senate for life, continually gained on its authority and
finally drew all power into their own hands. The Tribunes of Rome,
who were the representatives of the people, prevailed, it is well
known, in almost every contest with the senate for life, and in the
end gained the most complete triumph over it. The fact is the more
remarkable, as unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes,
even after their number was augmented to ten. It proves the
irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government,
which has the people on its side. To these examples might be added
that of Carthage, whose senate, according to the testimony of
Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the
commencement of the second Punic War, lost almost the whole of its
original portion.
Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of
facts, that the federal Senate will never be able to transform
itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic
body, we are warranted in believing, that if such a revolution
should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot
guard against, the House of Representatives, with the people on
their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution
to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the
immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be able to
maintain even the constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a
display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as
will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and
support of the entire body of the people themselves.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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