THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States
is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has
escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest
mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these,
who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the
election of the President is pretty well guarded. (footnote 1.) I
venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm that if the
manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in
an eminent degree all the advantages the union of which was to be
wished for.
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the
choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be
confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of
making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the
people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made
by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the
station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation,
and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements
which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons,
selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be
most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to
such complicated investigations.
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as
possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be
dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so
important an agency in the administration of the government as the
President of the United States. But the precautions which have been
so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an
effectual security against this mischief. The choice of several, to
form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to
convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements,
than the choice of one who was himself to be the final object of the
public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to
assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this
detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats
and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people,
than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle
should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most
deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have
been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter,
but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper
ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than
by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the
Union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this
sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not
made the appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting
bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute
their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an
immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice
of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the
appointment.
And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who
from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the
President in office. No senator, representative, or other person
holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be
of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body of
the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter
upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient
existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of,
afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the
conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace
so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor
would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they
would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon
motives, which though they could not properly be denominated
corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.
Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive
should be independent for his continuance in the office on all but
the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice
his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to
the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also
be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of
representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of
making the important choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the
convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a
number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and
representatives of such State in the national government, who shall
assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as
President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the
seat of the national government, and the person who may happen to
have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President.
But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to center in
one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to
be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House
of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have
the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may
be best qualified for the office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office
of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an
eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents
for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone
suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but
it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to
establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of
so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a
successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of
the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will
be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters
preeminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no
inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are
able to estimate the share which the executive in every government
must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we
cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says:
"For forms of government let fools contest--
That which is best administered is best,"--
yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government
is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the
President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in
respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of
Representatives, in respect to the latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has
been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been
alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the
Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that
description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the
convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the
possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary
that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the
senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that
of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the
State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The
other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally
become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive
magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election
prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to
the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this,
as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie
against the constitution of this State. We have a
Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in
the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor,
in casualties similar to those which would authorize the
Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties
of the President.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
Footnotes Explained:
Footnote Number 1. Vide Federal Farmer.
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