THE President is "to nominate, and, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, to her public
ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for in the Constitution. But the Congress may by law vest
the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in
the President alone, or in the course of law, in the heads of
departments. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies
which may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting
commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session."
It has been observed in a former paper, that "the true test of a
good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good
administration." If the justness of this observation be admitted,
the mode of appointing the officers of the United States contained
in the foregoing clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be
entitled to particular commendation. It is not easy to conceive a
plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of
men for filling the offices of the Union; and it will not need
proof, that on this point must essentially depend the character of
its administration.
It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of appointment, in
ordinary cases, ought to be modified in one of three ways. It ought
either to be vested in a single man, or in a select assembly of a
moderate number; or in a single man, with the concurrence of such an
assembly. The exercise of it by the people at large will be readily
admitted to be impracticable; as waiving every other consideration,
it would leave them little time to do any thing else. When,
therefore, mention is made in the subsequent reasonings, of an
assembly or body of men, what is said must be understood to relate
to a select body or assembly, of the description already given. The
people collectively, from their number and from their dispersed
situation, cannot be regulated in their movements by that systematic
spirit of cabal and intrigue, which will be urged as the chief
objections to reposing the power in question in a body of men.
Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject, or who have
attended to the observations made in other parts of these papers, in
relation to the appointment of the President, will, I presume, agree
to the position, that there would always be great probability of
having the place supplied by a man of abilities, at least
respectable. Premising this, I proceed to lay it down as a rule,
that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate
the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of
men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment.
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally
beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to
reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger
obligations, and more interested to investigate with care the
qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with
impartiality the persons who may have the fairest pretensions to
them. He will have fewer personal attachments to gratify, than a
body of men who may each be supposed to have an equal number; and
will be so much the less liable to be misled by the sentiments of
friendship and of affection. A single well-directed man, by a single
understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of
views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp
the resolutions of a collective body. There is nothing so apt to
agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations, whether
they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of
our choice or preference.
Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to offices by an
assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the
private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and
antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those
who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen to
be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result
either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a
compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit
of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the
qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party,
will be more considered than those which fit the person for the
station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some
interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for this office, and
you shall have the one you wish for that." This will be the usual
condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the
advancement of the public service will be the primary object either
of party victories or of party negotiations.
The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been felt by
the most intelligent of those who have found fault with the
provision made, in this respect, by the convention. They contend
that the President ought solely to have been authorized to make the
appointments under the federal government. But it is easy to show,
that every advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would,
in substance, be derived from the power of nomination, which is
proposed to be conferred upon him; while several disadvantages which
might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of that
officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his judgment
alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty to point
out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, should fill an
office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he were to
make the final appointment. There can, in this view, be no
difference between nominating and appointing. The same motives which
would influence a proper discharge of his duty in one case, would
exist in the other. And as no man could be appointed but on his
previous nomination, every man who might be appointed would be, in
fact, his choice.
But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet
this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself.
The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his
preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not
very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The
Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to
another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure
themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought forward
by a second or by an subsequent nomination. They could not even be
certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any
degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a
kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the
appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief
magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be
refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the
refusal.
To what purpose then require the cooperation of the Senate? I
answer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a
powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and
would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters
from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
attachment, or from a view to popularity. In addition to this, it
would be an efficacious source of stability in the administration.
It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself the sole
disposition of offices, would be governed much more by his private
inclinations and interests, than when he was bound to submit the
propriety of his choice to the discussion and determination of a
different and independent body, and that body an entire branch of
the legislature. The possibility of rejection would be a strong
motive to care in proposing. The danger to his own reputation, and,
in the case of an elective magistrate, to his political existence,
from betraying a spirit of favoritism, or an unbecoming pursuit of
popularity, to the observation of a body whose opinion would have
great weight in forming that of the public, could not fail to
operate as a barrier to the one and to the other. He would be both
ashamed and afraid to bring forward, for the most distinguished or
lucrative stations, candidates who had no other merit than that of
coming from the same State to which he particularly belonged, or of
being in some way or other personally allied to him, or of
possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them
the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.
To this reasoning it has been objected that the President, by the
influence of the power of nomination, may secure the complaisance of
the Senate to his views. This supposition of universal venality
inhuman nature is little less an error in political reasoning, than
the supposition of universal rectitude. The institution of delegated
power implies, that there is a portion of virtue and honor among
mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence; and
experience justifies the theory. It has been found to exist in the
most corrupt periods of the most corrupt governments. The venality
of the British House of Commons has been long a topic of accusation
against that body, in the country to which they belong, as well as
in this; and it cannot be doubted that the charge is to a
considerable extent, well founded. But it is as little to be
doubted, that there is always a large proportion of the body, which
consists of independent and public-spirited men, who have an
influential weight in the councils of the nation. Hence it is (the
present reign not excepted) that the sense of that body is often
seen to control the inclinations of the monarch, both with regard to
men and to measures. Though it might therefore be allowable to
suppose that the Executive might occasionally influence some
individuals in the Senate, yet the supposition, that he could in
general purchase the integrity of the whole body, would be forced
and improbable. A man disposed to view human nature as it is,
without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices,
will see sufficient ground of confidence in the probity of the
Senate, to rest satisfied, not only that it will be impracticable to
the Executive to corrupt or seduce a majority of its members, but
that the necessity of its cooperation, in the business of
appointments, will be a considerable and salutary restraint upon the
conduct of that magistrate. Nor is the integrity of the Senate the
only reliance.
The Constitution has provided some important guards against the
danger of executive influence upon the legislative body: it declares
that "No senator or representative shall, during the time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the United
States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof
shall have been increased, during such time; and no person, holding
any office under the United States, shall be a member of either
house during his continuance in office."
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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