IT HAS been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from
the cooperation of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that
it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The
consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to
appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not
occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of
the government as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of
offices. Where a man in any station had given satisfactory evidence
of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from
attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him, by
the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate
the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself. Those
who can best estimate the value of a steady administration, will be
most disposed to prize a provision which connects the official
existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of
that body which, from the greater permanency of its own composition,
will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy than any
other member of the government.
To this union of the Senate with the President, in the article of
appointments, it has in some cases been suggested that it would
serve to give the President an undue influence over the Senate, and
in others that it would have an opposite tendency,--a strong proof
that neither suggestion is true.
To state the first in its proper form, is to refute it. It amounts
to this: the President would have an improper influence over the
Senate, because the Senate would have the power of restraining him.
This is an absurdity in terms. It cannot admit of a doubt that the
entire power of appointment would enable him much more effectually
to establish a dangerous empire over that body, than a mere power or
nomination subject to their control.
Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition: "the Senate
would influence the Executive." As I have had occasion to remark in
several other instances, the indistinctness of the objection forbids
a precise answer. In what manner is this influence to be exerted? In
relation to what objects? The power of influencing a person, in the
sense in which it is here used, must imply a power of conferring a
benefit upon him. How could the Senate confer a benefit upon the
President by the manner of employing their right of negative upon
his nominations? If it be said they might sometimes gratify him by
an acquiescence in a favorite choice, when public motives might
dictate a different conduct, I answer, that the instances in which
the President could be personally interested in the result, would be
too few to admit of his being materially affected by the compliances
of the Senate. The POWER which can originate the disposition of
honors and emoluments, is more likely to attract than to be
attracted by the POWER which can merely obstruct their course. If by
influencing the President be meant restraining him, this is
precisely what must have been intended. And it has been shown that
the restraint would be salutary, at the same time that it would not
be such as to destroy a single advantage to be looked for from the
uncontrolled agency of that Magistrate. The right of nomination
would produce all the good of that of appointment, and would in a
great measure avoid its evils.
Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of the officers of
the proposed government with that which is established by the
constitution of this State, a decided preference must be given to
the former. In that plan the power of nomination is unequivocally
vested in the Executive. And as there would be a necessity for
submitting each nomination to the judgment of an entire branch of
legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment, from the
mode of conducting it, would naturally become matter of notoriety;
and the public would be at no loss to determine what part had been
performed by the different actors. The blame of a bad nomination
would fall upon the President singly and absolutely. The censure of
rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate;
aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the
good intentions of the Executive. If an ill appointment should be
made, the Executive for nominating, and the Senate for approving,
would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium
and disgrace.
The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment in
this State. The council of appointment consists of from three to
five persons, of whom the governor is always one. This small body,
shut up in a private apartment, impenetrable to the public eye,
proceed to the execution of the trust committed to them. It is known
that the governor claims the right of nomination, upon the strength
of some ambiguous expressions in the constitution; but it is not
known to what extent, or in what manner he exercises it; nor upon
what occasions he is contradicted or opposed. The censure of a bad
appointment, on account of the uncertainty of its author, and for
want of a determinate object, has neither poignancy nor duration.
And while an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue lies open, all
idea of responsibility is lost. The most that the public can know,
is that the governor claims the right of nomination; that two out of
the inconsiderable number of four men can too often be managed
without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a particular
council should happen to be of an uncomplying character, it is
frequently not impossible to get rid of their opposition by
regulating the times of meeting in such a manner as to render their
attendance inconvenient; and that from whatever cause it may
proceed, a great number of very improper appointments are from time
to time made. Whether a governor of this State avails himself of the
ascendant he must necessarily have, in this delicate an important
part of the administration, to prefer to offices men who are best
qualified for them, or whether he prostitutes that advantage to the
advancement of persons whose chief merit is their implicit devotion
to his will, and to the support of a despicable and dangerous system
of personal influence, are questions which, unfortunately for the
community, can only be the subjects of speculation and conjecture.
Every mere council of appointment, however constituted, will be a
conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their full scope.
Their number, without an unwarrantable increase of expense, cannot
be large enough to preclude a facility of combination. And as each
member will have his friends and connections to provide for, the
desire of mutual gratification will beget a scandalous bartering of
votes and bargaining for places. The private attachments of one man
might easily be satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments of
a dozen, or of twenty men, would occasion a monopoly of all the
principal employments of the government in a few families, and would
lead more directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy than any
measure that could be contrived. If, to avoid an accumulation of
offices, there was to be a frequent change in the persons who were
to compose the council, this would involve the mischiefs of a
mutable administration in their full extent. Such a council would
also be more liable to executive influence than the Senate, because
they would be fewer in number, and would act less immediately under
the public inspection. Such a council, in fine, as a substitute for
the plan of the convention, would be productive of an increase of
expense, a multiplication of the evils which spring from favoritism
and intrigue in the distribution of public honors, a decrease of
stability in the administration of the government, and a diminution
of the security against an undue influence of the Executive. And yet
such a council has been warmly contended for as an essential
amendment in the proposed Constitution.
I could not with propriety conclude my observations on the subject
of appointments without taking notice of a scheme for which there
have appeared some, though but few advocates; I mean that of uniting
the House of Representatives in the Power of making them. I shall,
however, do little more than mention it, as I cannot imagine that it
is likely to gain the countenance of any considerable part of the
community. A body so fluctuating and at the same time so numerous,
can never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power. Its
unfitness will appear manifest to all, when it is recollected that
in half a century it may consist of three or four hundred persons.
All the advantages of the stability, both of the Executive and of
the Senate, would be defeated by this union, and infinite delays and
embarrassments would be occasioned. The example of most of the
States in their local constitutions encourages us to reprobate the
idea.
The only remaining powers of the Executive are comprehended in
giving information to Congress of the state of the Union; in
recommending to their consideration such measures as he shall judge
expedient; in convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary
occasions; in adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree upon
the time of adjournment; in receiving ambassadors and other public
ministers; in faithfully executing the laws; and in commissioning
all the officers of the United States.
Except some cavils about the power of convening either house of the
legislature, and that of receiving ambassadors, no objection has
been made to this class of authorities; nor could they possibly
admit of any. It required, indeed, an insatiable avidity for censure
to invent exceptions to the parts which have been excepted to. In
regard to the power of convening either house of the legislature, I
shall barely remark, that in respect to the Senate at least, we can
readily discover a good reason for it. As this body has a concurrent
power with the Executive in the article of treaties, it might often
be necessary to call it together with a view to this object, when it
would be unnecessary and improper to convene the House of
Representatives. As to the reception of ambassadors, what I have
said in a former paper will furnish a sufficient answer.
We have not completed a survey of the structure and powers of the
executive department, which, I have endeavored to show, combines, as
far as republican principles will admit, all the requisites to
energy. The remaining inquiry is: Does it also combine the
requisites to safety, in a republican sense,--a due dependence on
the people, a due responsibility? The answer to this question has
been anticipated in the investigation of its other characteristics,
and is satisfactorily deducible from these circumstances; from the
election of the President once in four years by persons immediately
chosen by the people for that purpose; and from his being at all
times liable to impeachment, trial, dismission from office,
incapacity to serve in any other, and to forfeiture of life and
estate by subsequent prosecution in the common course of law.
But these precautions, great as they are, are not the only ones
which the plan of the convention has provided in favor of the public
security. In the only instances in which the abuse of the executive
authority was materially to be feared, the Chief Magistrate of the
United States would, by that plan, be subjected to the control of a
branch of the legislative body. What more could be desired by an
enlightened and reasonable people?
Signed "PUBLIUS"
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