ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers,
announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for
discussion two point: "the analogy of the proposed government to
your own State constitution," and "the additional security which its
adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to
property." But these heads have been so fully anticipated and
exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would not scarcely be
possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form,
what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the
question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention
to the act which organizes the government of this State holds, not
less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real
excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are the
re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the omission
of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecting
the liberty of the press. These and several others which have been
noted in the course of our inquiries are as much chargeable on the
existing constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the
Union; and a man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who
can rail at the latter for imperfections which he finds no
difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there be a
better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the
zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention among us, who
profess to be the devoted admirers of the government under which
they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that plan,
for matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or
perhaps more vulnerable.
The additional securities to republican government, to liberty, and
to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under
consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the
preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and
insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single
States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders
and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the
diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the
dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the
prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not
fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited
situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of
government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of
titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of
those practices on the part of the State governments which have
undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted
mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have
occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to
myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at
least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave
you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be
conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and
have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to
disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been
not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents
of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the
liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought
against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton
and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who
feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual
changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and
the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible
men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which
have been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the
public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all
honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have
occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I
did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a struggle
between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has in some
instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been neither
often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these
papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily
vindicated form the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has
not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary
to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer
these questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience
and understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober
dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can give
him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay,
constrained by all the obligations that form the bands of society,
to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no
particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or
prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his
posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him
beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the
object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of
the community, but the very existence of the nation; and let him
remember that a majority of America has already given its sanction
to the plan which he is to approve or reject.
I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the
arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and
that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has
been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our political
situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the
revolution has produced.
Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not
a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small
triumph to its enemies. "Why," say they, "should we adopt an
imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is
irrevocably established?" This may be plausible enough, but it is
only plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of
these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been
stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is radically
defective, and that without material alterations the rights and the
interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it. This, as
far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the
concessions, is an entire perversion of their sense. No advocate of
the measure can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment,
that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is,
upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and
circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as
promises every species of security which a reasonable people can
desire.
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of
imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs,
and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments,
in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a
perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberations of
all collective bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the
errors and prejudices, as of the good sense and wisdom, of the
individuals of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to
embrace thirteen distinct States in a common bond of amity and
union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar
interests and inclinations. How can perfection spring from such
materials?
The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately
published in this city, (footnote 1.) are unanswerable to show the
utter improbability of assembling a new convention, under
circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those
in which the late convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will
not repeat the arguments there used, as I presume the production
itself has had an extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy
the perusal of every friend to his country. There is, however, one
point of light in which the subject of amendments still remains to
be considered, and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public
view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of
it in this aspect.
It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will
be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to
the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the present
plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must
undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete establishment
throughout the Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of
thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the Constitution proposed
should once be ratified by all the States as it stands, alterations
in it may at any time be effected by nine States. Here, then, the
chances are as thirteen to nine (footnote 2.) in favor of subsequent
amendment, rather than of the original adoption of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must
inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which
thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their
interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see,
in any body of men charged with its original formation, very
different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of
those who form a majority on one question, may become the minority
on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute
the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and
arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in
such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and
hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and
casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The
degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the
number of particulars and the number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would
be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There
would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation
to any other point--no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite
number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And
consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in
the desire of a particular amendment that amendment must infallibly
take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between the
facility of affecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the
first instance a complete Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has
been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the
national government will always be disinclined to yield up any
portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my
own part, I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments
which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be
applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of
its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in
the observation just stated.
I also think there is little weight in it on another account. The
intrinsic difficulty of governing thirteen States at any rate,
independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit
and integrity, will, in my opinion, constantly impose on the
national rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the
reasonable expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a
further consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a
doubt, that the observation is futile. It is this, that the national
rulers, whenever nine States concur, will have no option upon the
subject. By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be
obliged "on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the
States [which at present amount to nine], to call a convention for
proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents and
purposes, as part of the Constitution, when ratified by the
legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by conventions in
three fourths thereof." The words of this article are peremptory.
The Congress "shall call a convention." Nothing in this particular
is left to the discretion of that body.
And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to
a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed
to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in
amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room
to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are
merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people. We
may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to
erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am
myself deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those
rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test
of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the
same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must
agree in the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct
road to their own object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the
Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the
truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid and
ingenious: "To balance a large state or society [says he], whether
monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great
difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by
the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The judgments
of many must unite in the work; experience must guide their labor;
time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of inconveniences
must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their
first trials and experiments." (footnote 3.)
These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all
the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon their
guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation
of the States from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of
a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely
to obtain, but from time and experience. It may be in me a defect of
political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an
equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a
longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A nation,
without a national government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.
The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by
the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy, to the
completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can
reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have,
in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States,
and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground,
to recommence the course.
I dread the more the consequences of new attempts, because I know
that powerful individuals, in this and in other States, are enemies
to a general national government in every possible shape.
Signed "PUBLIUS"
Footnotes Explained:
Footnote Number 1. Entitled "An Address to the People of the State
of New York."
Footnote Number 2. It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds
may set on foot the measure, three fourths must ratify.
Footnote Number 3. Hume's "Essays," Vol. i., page 128, "The Rise of
Arts and Science."
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